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Supreme Court’s decision in her case.1 The article glossed over the
import of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the new Fourteenth
Amendment and focused instead on the Illinois court’s underlying
decision to deny women the right to practice law.2 The piece had a
pejorative tone because, three years earlier when Bradwell filed her
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, Missouri had become the second state
to grant a woman a license to practice law.3 By the time the Supreme
Court rendered its decision in April 1873, five states and the District of
Columbia had admitted women to their bars.4 The St. Louis Republican,
a Democratic newspaper, readily chided its northern neighbor:
It seems very hard for some of the Republican States to learn a simple
lesson in that liberality which they pretend to teach to others. Women,
qualified for the vocation, are admitted to the bar in Missouri, without
let or hindrance, and no shock to our social system has come of the
practice. But the Republicans of Illinois appear to have the same
horror of a woman that an old-fashioned Democrat once had of a
negro.5

This short article reveals an important insight that challenges some
contemporary interpretations of Bradwell v. Illinois. First, it points out
what we know, but sometimes overlook, that the Supreme Court holding
in Bradwell did not prevent women from becoming lawyers or practicing
law.6 More importantly, however, it suggests that Justice Bradley’s oftcited concurrence – where he reveals his horror of a woman, writing that
“[t]he harmony, not to say identity, of interest and views which belong,
or should belong, to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a
woman adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her
husband”7 – that this opinion was perhaps not the dominant ideology of
the day. Looking beyond the Supreme Court opinions, this paper
attempts to assess what Bradwell v. Illinois meant to Myra Bradwell and
the women’s rights movement.

1. CHI. LEGAL NEWS, June 14, 1873, at 454 (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision to
uphold the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision to deny Myra Bradwell’s law license application).
2. Id.
3. A Woman Admitted to the Bar in Missouri, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Apr. 3, 1870, at 212.
4. KAREN BERGER MORELLO, THE INVISIBLE BAR: THE WOMAN LAWYER IN AMERICA 1638
TO THE PRESENT 37-38 (1986) (Iowa, Missouri, Michigan, Maine, and Utah).
5. CHI. LEGAL NEWS, supra note 1, at 454.
6. Frances Olsen, From False Paternalism to False Equality: Judicial Assaults on Feminist
Community, Illinois 1869-1895, 84 MICH. L. REV 1518, 1529 (1986); MORELLO, supra note 4, at
21-22.
7. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring).
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Many scholars have well and thoroughly analyzed both Justice
Miller’s majority opinion and Justice Bradley’s concurring opinion.8
Richard Aynes even crafted a hypothetical opinion for Chief Justice
Chase, the sole dissenter in the case, as Chase died before he was able to
write his own opinion.9 Additionally, almost every constitutional law
casebook includes at least a note discussing the case.10 The note
typically follows or cites Slaughter-House Cases and describes Bradwell
as the second nail in the coffin of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Privileges and Immunities Clause.11 They explain that in Bradwell,
Justice Miller reiterated the majority’s holding from its holding in
Slaughter-House Cases that the Clause only protected the privileges and
immunities of national citizenship and that the right to work in one’s
chosen profession was not one of those privileges.12
Most casebooks also include Bradwell as representative of the
Court’s support for the ideology of separate spheres.13 This concept
divided social roles based on gender, preserving the public domain for
men and relegating women to the private, domestic sphere.14 This

8. Rogers M. Smith, “One United People”: Second-Class Female Citizenship and the
American Quest for Community, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 229, 260-61 (1989); JOAN HOFF, LAW,
GENDER, AND INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN (1991); Nancy T. Gilliam, A
Professional Pioneer: Myra Bradwell’s Fight to Practice Law, 5 L. & HIST. REV. 105 (1987);
Olsen, supra note 6, at 1527-29; DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION
AND THE LAW 21-22 (1989); WILLIAM WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL
THOUGHT: LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA, 1886-1937, at 150 (1998); 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE
SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY VOLUME 1836-1918, at 550 (1935); 4 CHARLES
FAIRMAN, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88, at 1364-68 (1971).
9. Richard L. Aynes, Bradwell v. Illinois: Chief Justice Chase’s Dissent and the “Sphere of
Women’s Work”, 59 LA. L. REV. 521, 537-38 (1999).
10. See, e.g., JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 827 (6th ed.
2000); DOUGLAS W. KMIEC ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HISTORY, CASES,
AND PHILOSOPHY 1179 (2d ed. 2004); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 648 (4th ed. 2001).
11. See, e.g., NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 10, at 827; KMIEC ET AL., supra note 10, at
1179; SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 10, at 648.
12. See supra note 11.
13. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 622 (5th ed. 2005); KMIEC
ET AL., supra note 10, at 1399; SULLIVAN & GUNTHER supra note 10, at 648; WALTER F. MURPHY
ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 744 (1986) (citing the decision in Bradwell
as part of the Court’s “judicial indifference to the rights of persons who were not white males”).
See also Ellen Carol DuBois, Taking the Law into Our Own Hands: Bradwell, Minor, and Suffrage
Militance in the 1870s, in VISIBLE WOMEN: NEW ESSAYS ON AMERICAN ACTIVISM 30 (Nancy A.
Hewitt & Suzanne Lebsock eds., 1993); JANE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICA’S FIRST WOMAN LAWYER:
THE BIOGRAPHY OF MYRA BRADWELL 21 (1993).
14. For discussions of the concept of separate spheres, see Barbara Welter, The Cult of True
Womanhood: 1820-1860, 18 AM. Q. 151 (1966); NANCY F. COTT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD:
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interpretation of Bradwell cites Justice Bradley’s infamous concurrence
where he, perhaps too vociferously, espoused support for the “wide
difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman”
and revealed his horror of a woman who acted outside of her sphere.15
These casebooks suggest, I believe mistakenly, that Bradley’s
perspective represented the dominant gender ideology that endured into
the twentieth century.16
The most progressive casebooks and a number of additional legal
scholars place Bradwell v. Illinois, I believe correctly, within the
women’s rights movement.17 Myra Bradwell was among the women’s
rights activists that immediately perceived the potential of the new
Fourteenth Amendment to emancipate women.18 She used her case to
make a claim on the Amendment, hoping to secure an interpretation that
its provisions granted women full citizenship rights, privileges, and
obligations and ensured them due process and equal protection of the
law.19 These accounts agree with the traditional assessment that the
majority opinion in Bradwell reaffirmed the Court’s interpretation of the
privileges and immunities clause, but by contextualizing the case within
the women’s rights movement, they suggest that Bradwell and other
women’s rights activists were involved in an assault on the separate
spheres doctrine that was gaining some support.20 This context also
allows us to see the connection between Myra Bradwell, Elizabeth Cady
Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and Virginia Minor and the strategy they
pursued to use the Fourteenth Amendment to bring women into the
public sphere as full and equal citizens.21

“WOMAN’S SPHERE” IN NEW ENGLAND, 1730-1835 (1977); Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, The Female
World of Love and Ritual: Relations between Women in Nineteenth-Century America, 1 SIGNS 1
(1975).
15. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring).
16. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 10, at 827-28 (“The views quoted here [by Justice
Bradley] were representative of the attitudes women met when they attempted to challenge sexbased classifications.”); see also DuBois, supra note 13, at 30.
17. PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND
MATERIALS 1179-80 (5th ed. 2006); LOUIS FISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 945-54 (3d
ed. 1999); DuBois, supra note 13, at 30; Gilliam, supra note 8, at 115.
18. BREST ET AL., supra note 17, at 1180; DuBois, supra note 13, at 30; Gilliam, supra note 8,
at 115.
19. The XIV Amendment and Our Case, 5 CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Apr. 19, 1873, at 354.
20. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
21. BREST et al., supra note 17, at 1179-80; FISHER, supra note 17, at 946-48. For a
discussion of Virginia Minor and her case, Minor v. Happersett, see DuBois, supra note 13, at 22.
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Bradwell was a leader in the Illinois women’s rights movement.22
She initiated her case at a time when the women’s rights movement was
beginning to divide over the issue of woman suffrage and the Fifteenth
Amendment.23 I contend that Bradwell was not part of that divide, but
rather represented a third faction of the women’s rights movement that
pursued a comprehensive strategy of securing women’s legal equality
through affirmative rights claims.24 Bradwell and her followers
maintained this strategy as the splintering factions narrowed their focus
to securing woman suffrage and later abandoned what Ellen Carol
DuBois described as their original “democratic vision.”25 Bradwell
never chose sides in the fight between the National Woman Suffrage
Association, led by Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, and
the American Woman Suffrage Association, led by Lucy Stone and Julia
Ward Howe.26 Instead, she held fast to her democratic vision,
maintained relationships with both groups, and developed her arguments
in concert with those activists who were intent on establishing that the
Fourteenth Amendment granted women full and equal citizenship rights,
privileges, and obligations.27
I argue that through her case Myra Bradwell developed two legal
innovations that would be invoked by other rights activists through the
remainder of the nineteenth century and throughout much of the
twentieth century, albeit sometimes in opposition to each other. The
first was an argument that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment should be applied to women.28 The second was the

22. FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 11; Death of Mrs. Myra Bradwell, 28 AM. L. REV. 278
(1894); Myra Bradwell 26 CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Feb. 17, 1894, at 200-02.
23. See ELLEN CAROL DUBOIS, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF AN
INDEPENDENT WOMEN’S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 1848-1869, at 162-202 (1978) (describing the
first split in the women’s rights movement, which occurred in 1869, over whether to support the
Fifteenth Amendment that granted suffrage to African-American men, but not to women).
24. I develop this argument more fully in Agents of (Incremental) Change: From Myra
Bradwell to Hillary Clinton, NEV. L.J. (forthcoming).
25. DuBois, supra note 13, at 21. Anthony and Stanton held onto their democratic vision
longer than the leaders of the AWSA, but by 1890 when the NWSA merged with the AWSA to
become the NAWSA the leaders had also narrowed their focus and dropped their attacks on separate
spheres. MARY BECKER, CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN & MORRISON TORREY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY 10-11 (1994).
26. ELEANOR FLEXNER & ELLEN FITZPATRICK, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE: THE WOMAN’S
RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 145-46 (Harvard Univ. Press 1996) (1959).
27. See infra Part I.
28. See Gilliam, supra note 8, at 115 (arguing that Bradwell’s “fourteenth amendment
argument was based on equality” and that her “perception of the issue was generations ahead of her
time”). It was an adaptation of the New Departure arguments set forth by Francis Minor and
adopted by many suffragists. See infra note 152.
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introduction of a new form of legal interpretation that set forth the
foundations of what would later be called sociological jurisprudence.29
As elite lawyers and justices were advocating an ideology that William
Wiecek has labeled “legal classicism,” which was based on the notion
that the legal order was an “autonomous, determinate, natural, neutral,
necessary, objective, and apolitical structure of principles and norms,”30
Bradwell was adapting the ideology of instrumentalism to the cause of
women’s rights, crafting what I will call pre-sociological jurisprudence
arguments.31
To support these claims, Part II situates Bradwell firmly within the
women’s rights movement and asserts that she intended her case to
advance women’s rights beyond opening the legal profession to women.
Part III sets forth the arguments Bradwell presented in support of her
application for a law license to the Illinois Supreme Court. It
demonstrates how Bradwell developed a line of legal reasoning that
drew on the principles of instrumentalism but transformed its goal to one
of social justice. It describes how Bradwell asked the court to view the
law within a broad social context, to consider the changing social and
economic circumstances when interpreting the law, and to apply the law
in a manner that would secure social justice. It further asserts that
Bradwell’s claim of sex discrimination was based, in part, on the Equal
Protection Clause of the new Fourteenth Amendment. Part IV sets forth
some of the responses by the public and those in the legal community
that supported Bradwell and other women’s rights activists making
similar claims. These popular responses were critical of the majority
opinion and the endorsement of separate spheres articulated in Justice

29. Sociological jurisprudence is philosophy that the law be viewed “within a broad social
context rather than as an isolated phenomenon” and that “legislation and court adjudications
[should] take into account the findings of other branches of learning, particularly the social
sciences.” Justice William O. Douglas, Jurisprudence, Microsoft® Encarta® Online Encyclopedia
(2008), available at http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761558172/Jurisprudence.html.
30. WIECEK, supra note 8, at 3, 175, 177-80; see Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and
Legal Practice in the Age of American Enterprise 1870-1920, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL
IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 70 (Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983) (arguing that elite lawyers during this
time fought against an instrumental approach to law and advocated instead a scientific, formalist
approach); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 3, 109-42 (1992); KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 223 (1989).
31. The term sociological jurisprudence was coined by Roscoe Pound in the first decade of
the twentieth century. WIECEK, supra note 8, at 191-93. Bradwell and the others who developed
these arguments in the nineteenth century did not give it a name. For purposes of this article, I will
refer to these early arguments as “pre-sociological jurisprudence.” For a discussion of
instrumentalism see HALL, supra note 30, at 106; WIECEK, supra note 8, at 44.
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Bradley’s concurrence. It argues that these criticisms cast doubt on the
notion that the separate spheres doctrine was as widely and uncritically
accepted as Justice Bradley implied.
The article concludes with an assessment that this is not a story of
grand victory. Women did and continue to face discrimination within
the legal profession and society.32 The obstacles were and are even
greater for women of color.33 But there have been incremental advances.
Bradwell was ultimately admitted to both the Illinois and the Supreme
Court bars.34 By 1950 every state in the Union admitted women
lawyers.35 In 1971 the Supreme Court began using the Equal Protection
Clause to strike down sex discrimination.36 In 1981 the first woman
Justice was appointed to the United States Supreme Court.37 This article
suggests that the tools Myra Bradwell crafted in concert with other midnineteenth century women activists served as an important foundation
for the incremental advances women secured over the subsequent one
hundred and fifty years.
II. MYRA BRADWELL AS A LEADER IN THE WOMEN’S RIGHTS
MOVEMENT
Myra Colby Bradwell was a rights activist her entire life. Like
many of the women activists of her generation, she was raised as an
abolitionist.38 She was also among the first cohort of women who were
able to take advantage of the opportunity to study in the seminaries and
colleges that were newly opened to women.39 In 1852, at age twenty32. See generally Smith, supra note 8; see also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMM. ON
WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: OVERCOMING THE SISYPHUS FACTOR (1995);
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMM. ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, CHARTING OUR PROGRESS:
THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION TODAY 4 (2006).
33. JANET E. GANS EPNER, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMM. ON WOMEN IN THE
PROFESSION, VISIBLE INVISIBILITY: WOMEN OF COLOR IN LAW FIRMS (2006).
34. FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 30 (stating that Bradwell refused to reapply for her license,
but when she was dying of cancer, her husband convinced the Illinois Supreme Court to admit her
based on her original motion; Bradwell was admitted to the bar in Illinois in 1890 and to the
Supreme Court in 1892, two years before her death).
35. See MORELLO, supra note 4, at 37-38.
36. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971); BECKER, supra note 25, at 25.
37. MORELLO, supra note 4, at 218.
38. FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 35; 1 THE BENCH AND BAR OF ILLINOIS 277 (John Palmer
ed., 1899); Death of Mrs. Myra Bradwell, supra note 22, at 278.
39. FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 35-36 (stating that Bradwell first attended female seminary
in Kenosha, Wisconsin and then, in 1851, studied at the newly established Elgin Seminary); Myra
Bradwell, supra note 22, at 200. For a discussion of nineteenth century female seminaries in the
Midwest, see STEPHEN M. BUECHLER, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE
MOVEMENT: THE CASE OF ILLINOIS, 1850-1920, at 58 (1986); see also KAREN J. BLAIR, THE
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one, she married fellow abolitionist and lawyer James Bradwell.40 When
her husband opened his first law office in Chicago in 1855, Myra
Bradwell assisted him in his practice. 41 Within a few years, she
determined to become a lawyer herself: “I came to find out that a woman
could accomplish as much labor in the same lines as a man, and
therefore,” Bradwell explained, “I concluded to read law.”42
CLUBWOMAN AS FEMINIST: TRUE WOMANHOOD REDEFINED 1868-1914, at 8-9 (1980). For a
broader discussion of the development of female seminaries see BARBARA MILLER SOLOMON, IN
THE COMPANY OF EDUCATED WOMEN: A HISTORY OF WOMEN AND HIGHER EDUCATION IN
AMERICA 14-26 (1985).
40. Myra Bradwell, supra note 22, at 200. James Bradwell studied at the soundly abolitionist
Knox College in Galesburg, Illinois. HERMAN KOGAN, THE FIRST CENTURY: THE CHICAGO BAR
ASSOCIATION, 1874-1974, at 24 (1974). Reverend George Washington Gale, the founder of Knox
College, organized an antislavery society in Knox County within five months of the college’s
incorporation. HERMANN R. MUELDER, MISSIONARIES AND MUCKRAKERS: THE FIRST HUNDRED
YEARS OF KNOX COLLEGE 6 (1984). Elijah Lovejoy published the call to establish this society in
his antislavery paper the Observer – an act that led to his murder. Id. Though there was
tremendous support for the Society among Gale and the new settlers who worked at Knox College,
proslavery advocates attacked and killed Lovejoy ten days after the society was founded. Id. The
founders and supporters of Knox College nonetheless remained steadfast in their antislavery
position and their abolition activities, including having the president of the college attend the 1843
World Anti-Slavery Convention in London. Id. at 10.
41. Most accounts chronologize that James Bradwell and Myra Colby married in Illinois in
1852, subsequently moved to Memphis for two years where they operated a private school, and
returned to Illinois in 1854 or 1855. FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 41; Caroline K. Goddard,
Bradwell, Myra Colby, in WOMEN BUILDING CHICAGO 1790-1990: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY
112 (Rima Lunin Schultz & Adele Hast eds., 2001); 1 Dorothy Thomas, Bradwell, Myra Colby, in
NOTABLE AMERICAN WOMEN 1607-1950: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 223 (Edward T. James ed.,
1971); Kogan, supra note 40, at 24; DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 580-81; George
W. Gale, Myra Bradwell: The First Woman Lawyer, 39 A.B.A. J. 1080 (1953); Gilliam, supra note
8, at 106 (stating that the couple married in Tennessee). Most accounts also agree that James
Bradwell was admitted to the Illinois bar in 1855 and opened a law office that year. FRIEDMAN,
supra note 13, at 41 (stating that James Bradwell was also admitted to the Tennessee bar); Goddard,
supra, at 112; Thomas, supra, at 223; DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, supra, at 580.
Some accounts cite that James Bradwell opened his Chicago law office in partnership with Myra’s
brother, Frank Colby. FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 41; Goddard, supra, at 112; Thomas, supra, at
223. See also Obituary. Eben F. Colby, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Aug. 16, 1884, at 391 (describing that
Colby was Myra’s brother and that he and James Bradwell maintained the law firm of Bradwell and
Colby for several years). Most state that Myra Bradwell began to assist her husband in his law
practice and then, sometime after that but before 1868 began to study the law herself. FRIEDMAN,
supra note 13, at 41; Thomas, supra, at 224; Kogan, supra note 40, at 24-25; Gilliam, supra note 8,
at 106; Gale, supra, at 1080. Goddard, supra, at 112. In response to a newspaper reporter’s
interview questions, James Bradwell recollected that he was admitted to the Illinois bar and opened
an office in Chicago in 1853. All Dabble in the Law, CHI. DAILY TRIB., May 12, 1889, at 26; see
also 1 FREDERIC B. CROSSLEY, COURTS AND LAWYERS OF ILLINOIS 263 (1916) (asserting that
James Bradwell returned to Chicago, was admitted to the Illinois bar and opened a law practice in
1853).
42. All Dabble in the Law, supra note 41. In this interview Myra Bradwell dates the
beginning of her formal legal studies at 1857: “about five years after our marriage I determined to
read [law] in good earnest.” Id.
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Bradwell interrupted her studies during the Civil War to join other
northern reform women in active support of the Union Army.43 She was
president of the Soldiers’ Aid Society, one of the organizations that
provided medical services and supplies to wounded soldiers and relief to
their families.44 She also was an officer in the Northwestern Sanitary
Commission, established to assist in maintaining hygienic field hospitals
and camps, and she worked diligently in the production of 1863 and
1867 Northwestern Sanitary Fairs that raised money for the Union
Army.45 Through these activities Bradwell and the other Commission
activists learned how to establish and lead organizations to advance a
cause.46 After the war, she began her fight for women’s rights in
earnest.
Bradwell’s first step was to establish a legal newspaper for lawyers
and judges that prominently featured legal issues relating to women.47
Because some of the laws of coverture still applied,48 Bradwell
petitioned the Illinois legislature for a special charter that allowed her to
enter into contracts necessary for her to own and operate her own
business.49 In October 1868, Bradwell founded the Chicago Legal
News, the city’s only weekly legal newspaper.50 Within five months the
43. Thomas, supra note 41, at 223.
44. Id. at 224.
45. Myra Bradwell, supra note 22, at 201; see also Mrs. Mary A. Livermore, 16 CHI. LEGAL
NEWS, Jan. 26, 1884, at 166 (where Bradwell describes the fairs and praises Mary Livermore for her
leadership role). The Northwestern Sanitary Fairs were one of many local sanitary fairs that raised
money for the Union Army. THE BENCH AND BAR OF ILLINOIS, supra note 38, at 278. For
descriptions of the Sanitary Commissions see FLEXNER & FITZPATRICK, supra note 26, at 100-01; 2
BESSIE LOUISE PIERCE, A HISTORY OF CHICAGO: FROM TOWN TO CITY, 1848-1871, at 453, 455
(1940); KATHLEEN D. MCCARTHY, NOBLESSE OBLIGE: CHARITY AND CULTURAL PHILANTHROPY
IN CHICAGO, 1849-1929, at 34-35 (1982); MARY A. LIVERMORE, MY STORY OF THE WAR: A
WOMAN’S NARRATIVE OF FOUR YEARS PERSONAL EXPERIENCE AS NURSE IN THE UNION ARMY,
AND IN RELIEF WORK AT HOME, IN HOSPITALS, CAMPS, AND AT THE FRONT, DURING THE WAR OF
THE REBELLION 411-56 (1889).
46. BUECHLER, supra note 39, at 59.
47. Myra Bradwell, supra note 22, at 200; Goddard, supra note 41, at 113; FRIEDMAN, supra
note 13, at 77-78.
48. The doctrine of coverture tied women’s legal status to her marital or kin relationships. A
married woman was thought to become one with her husband, a union that effectively rendered her
civilly dead. See NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK 17-19, 20-24 (1982); Linda E. Speth, The Married Women’s
Property Acts, 1839-1865: Reform, Reactions, or Revolution?, in WOMEN AND THE LAW: A SOCIAL
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE VOLUME II: PROPERTY, FAMILY AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 69-70 (D.
Kelly Weisberg ed., 1982); Carole Shammas, Re-Assessing the Married Women’s Property Acts, 6
J. WOMEN’S HIST. 9, 10 (1994); SANDRA F. VANBURKLEO, “BELONGING TO THE WORLD”:
WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE 108-10 (2001).
49. FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 77.
50. Id.; Myra Bradwell, supra note 22, at 200.
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Illinois legislature granted the paper a special charter to immediately
publish all new laws passed at the end of each legislative session.51 It
also deemed that the paper’s publication of those laws was proper
evidence of their content in court and that the paper was a sufficient
method of publication of legal notices.52 The paper quickly became an
important resource for lawyers and earned praise from lawyers and
judges in Chicago and across the country.53
Bradwell published the Chicago Legal News for a year before she
applied for her law license. During that year she became one of the
leaders of the women’s rights movement in Illinois and utilized her
paper, with its large male readership, as one of her primary tools to
advance the cause. Bradwell filled the Legal News with articles on the
professional and political activities of women, prominently chronicling
women’s participation in the legal profession.54 She also advocated for a
number of women’s rights law reforms, including woman suffrage and
property rights.55 One of her first successful legislative campaigns,
which she conducted largely within the pages of the Chicago Legal
News, was to secure the enactment of Illinois’ second Married Woman’s
Property Act.
In 1865 the Illinois Supreme Court had ruled that the state’s first
Married Women’s Property Act, passed in 1861, failed to grant women
the right to own and control their own wages.56 By the 1870s there was
a national movement to pass Married Women’s Property Acts.57 Like
Illinois, many state legislatures and courts maintained that a married
women’s wages were not her separate property and therefore were not
covered by the Acts.58 They maintained that under the doctrine of
coverture, these wages belonged to the husband.59 Women’s rights

51. The Laws of 1869, 1 CHI. LEGAL NEWS 188 (Mar. 13, 1869); Myra Bradwell, supra note
22, at 200; FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 79.
52. FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 79.
53. 6 INDUSTRIAL CHICAGO: THE BENCH AND BAR 642 (1896); Goddard, supra note 41, at
113; The Myra Bradwell Case, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 20, 1873, at 8 (describing the Chicago Legal
News as “the best law-newspaper in the country”).
54. For example, in one of her first issues Bradwell reported that Mary E. Magoon was
practicing law in the lower courts in North English, Iowa (where a law license was not required).
Female Lawyer, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Feb. 27, 1869, at 172.
55. INDUSTRIAL CHICAGO, supra note 53, at 642; FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 78.
56. Bear v. Hays, 36 Ill. 280, 281 (1865).
57. BASCH, supra note 48, at 136-37; HOFF, supra note 8, at 127-31. For a discussion of the
movement for Married Women’s Property Acts before 1870, see Speth, supra note 48.
58. AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND
THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 197-200 (1998).
59. Id.
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activists were engaged in a campaign to change these laws and Bradwell
led the charge in Illinois.60 During the paper’s first year Bradwell
flooded the News with articles imploring the Illinois legislature to pass a
second act that would deem women’s wages to be their sole and separate
property and even travelled to Springfield to lobby for the bill in
person.61 She relentlessly pursued the matter until the legislature finally
acquiesced with a second act in March 1869.62
During this time, Bradwell also participated in organizing the
Illinois Woman’s Suffrage Association (IWSA) and found herself in the
middle of a fight among the leaders of the national suffrage movement.63
The IWSA was one of two woman suffrage organizations established in
Illinois in February 1869.64 Bradwell was elected an officer in the
IWSA and her position brought her into contact with Susan B. Anthony
and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, two of the national leaders who both
attended and addressed the IWSA’s founding convention.65 Bradwell
and her husband were among those elected as representatives of the
IWSA to attend the National Equal Rights Association Convention held
three months later in May 1869.66 Bradwell again interacted with
Stanton and Anthony at the Equal Rights convention, but like many of
the attendees, disagreed with their decision to oppose the Fifteenth
Amendment if women were not included.67 This disagreement led to a
well-studied split among the woman suffrage activists. Susan B.
Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton led the dissenting faction and
60. Id. at 176-77, 201-03.
61. See Husband and Wife – Property of Latter Under Law of 1861, CHI. LEGAL NEWS 22
(Oct. 17, 1868) (specifying the inequalities that persisted in the Illinois property laws). Law
Relating to Women, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Oct. 31, 1868, at 37; CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Jan. 9, 1869, at 117
(informing readers that New Hampshire passed a married earning act and asserting: “We hope,
before the adjournment of the present legislature, they will have that right in Illinois.”); Talk with
the Legislature, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Feb. 27, 1869, at 172; Married Women’s Separate Property
Under Act of 1861, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Nov. 13, 1869, at 53.
62. An Act in Relation to the Earnings of Married Women, LAWS OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 255 (1869). The law was approved March 24, 1869. It
established that married women’s wages were their sole and separate property, but specified that the
act did not give a wife “any right to compensation from any labor performed for her minor children
or husband.”
63. BUECHLER, supra note 39, at 68-75.
64. Id.
65. Id at 70-71.
66. Kate Doggett, Rev. E.J. Goodspeed, and Rebecca Mott were also elected to attend the
ERA convention. Chicago Woman Suffrage Convention, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Feb. 20, 1869, at 164;
BUECHLER, supra note 39, at 71.
67. BUECHLER, supra note 39, at 70-71. See DUBOIS, supra note 23, at 162-202 (describing
the first split in the women’s rights movement, which occurred in 1869, over whether to support the
Fifteenth Amendment that granted black suffrage to African-American men, but not to women).
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established the National Woman Suffrage Association (NWSA) as an
independent woman suffrage organization.68 Lucy Stone, her husband
Henry Blackwell, and Julia Ward Howe responded by establishing the
American Woman Suffrage Association (AWSA).69
Bradwell refused to take sides in the split. She was part of the
coalition in the IWSA that kept the Illinois association neutral in the
national fight during its first two years.70 Bradwell served on the
executive committee of the IWSA and hosted its meetings in the
Chicago Legal News offices.71 She was elected, along with her husband,
and a number of others, to attend the AWSA’s first convention in
Cleveland in November 1869.72 But the delegates’ relationship with the
AWSA was qualified. They were bound by a resolution, adopted
unanimously by the IWSA executive committee, which required them to
maintain a neutral position in the fight between the national suffrage
factions:
Resolved, That the delegates elected to the National Convention be
requested not to identify themselves with any division that may exist
among prominent workers in the cause in other parts of the country, or
to participate in any action intended as antagonistic to any existing
Woman’s Suffrage organization.73

The delegates abided by their resolution. When Susan B. Anthony
appeared at the hall in Cleveland, James Bradwell urged the leaders of
the AWSA to allow her to sit on the platform and address the
convention.74 Myra Bradwell was elected one of two Secretaries for the
AWSA,75 but the IWSA did not affiliate with the association and
Bradwell did not agree to exclusive membership. At the first meeting of
the IWSA executive committee after the convention, the delegates
acknowledged the animosity that existed between the leaders of the two
national organizations and expressed their desire to “promote harmony
in the furtherance of the great object sought to be attached by both

68. See DUBOIS, supra note 23, at 195.
69. Id.
70. DUBOIS, supra note 23, at 198-99.
71. Woman’s Suffrage. Election of Delegates to the National Convention at Cleveland, CHI.
TRIB., Nov. 14, 1869, at 1.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 2 THE SELECTED PAPERS OF ELIZABETH CADY STANTON AND SUSAN B. ANTHONY:
AGAINST AN ARISTOCRACY OF SEX: 1866 TO 1873, at 284 (Ann D. Gordon ed., 2000) (hereinafter
PAPERS).
75. Conventions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1869, at 1; BUECHLER, supra note 39, at 86.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol42/iss4/13

12

Jordan: "Horror of a Woman"

13-JORDAN.DOC

2009]

6/30/2009 4:12 PM

“HORROR OF A WOMAN”

1213

sections.”76 They discussed the possibility of forming a Northwestern
Suffrage Association as a means of bringing the other two factions
together77 and then passed a second resolution that reiterated the IWSA’s
neutrality:
Resolved, That while we sympathize with the objects had in view in
the formation of the National Woman Suffrage Associations formed in
Cleveland and New York, we will not become auxiliary to either, until
the difficulties between the two are settled.78

The IWSA preserved its middle position for another fifteen months.
During that time, the IWSA steadfastly urged the two national
associations to merge.79 It even persuaded both Susan B. Anthony and
Lucy Stone to come to a meeting in Chicago in November 1870 to
“review the contest.”80 But the IWSA suffered its own division six
months later that caused the Bradwells and five other officers to
withdraw from the association and allowed Stanton and Anthony
sympathizers to take over the IWSA in April 1871.81 The Bradwells,
nonetheless, maintained their neutral position.
The fracture in the IWSA occurred over issues of religion and
divorce. Bradwell and those who withdrew opposed the practice of “free
divorce”82 and were offended by a pamphlet written by Alonzo J.
76. Woman’s Suffrage, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 5, 1870, at 4.
77. Id. Some members of the committee who were also members of the Cook County
Woman Suffrage Association (CCWSA) did act on the idea of a Northwestern Suffrage
Association. Five months after the meeting the CCWSA published an initial call for a meeting in
Chicago for anyone interested in the possibility of forming a Northwestern association. Female
Suffrage, CHI. TRIB., May 19, 1870, at 1. A Northwestern Association was established on May 25,
1870, but it appears that it was sympathetic to Susan B. Anthony and the NWSA and not neutral.
See Woman Suffrage, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1870, at 5; Woman’s Suffrage Convention of the
Northwestern Franchise Association, CHI. TRIB., May 26, 1870, at 3.
78. Woman’s Suffrage, supra note 76.
79. The Woman Suffrage Associations – Illinois Advocates Urge Union, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21,
1870, at 2; Woman Suffrage, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 27, 1870, at 3.
80. Woman Suffrage, supra note 79.
81. Female Suffrage: Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Illinois Association, CHI.
TRIB., Apr. 19, 1871, at 3; BUECHLER, supra note 39, at 104.
82. Female Suffrage: Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Illinois Association, CHI.
TRIB., Apr. 19, 1871, at 3. The term “free divorce” was used interchangeably with “easy divorce”
and often in connection with the concept of “free love.” Free-Love and Free-Divorce, EVERY
SATURDAY: A JOURNAL OF CHOICE READING, July 22, 1871, at 75; War in the Woman Suffrage
Camp. Mrs. Henry H. Stanton. Free Divorce and Free Love, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 13, 1870, at 2; Taking
the Back-Track, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 14, 1872, at 5; Judge Farwell on Divorce, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 22,
1872, at 4; Woman and Easy Divorce, THE INDEPENDENT, Dec. 28, 1871, at 4. It was also called
“freedom of divorce.” Editorial Article, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 27, 1871, at 2; see also STANLEY, supra
note 58 at 178. Free love embraced the concept of women’s sexuality and advocated that women
had the right to decline sexual intercourse. BARBARA GOLDSMITH, OTHER POWERS: THE AGE OF
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Grover, which was published by the Executive Committee of the Cook
County Woman’s Suffrage Association (CCWSA), that challenged the
authority of the Bible.83 The CCWSA was established in April 1870 as
an independent suffrage association, but many of its members, including
Grover and Catharine and Charles Waite, were members of both the
CCWSA and the IWSA.84 Catharine Waite and Jane Graham Jones, the
primary leaders of the CCWSA during its first years, both sympathized
with Susan B. Anthony.85 In 1871, just before the division occurred, and
SUFFRAGE, SPIRITUALISM, AND THE SCANDALOUS VICTORIA WOODHULL, 208 (1998). Opponents
to free love described it as “free lust.” Editorial Article 2, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 14, 1870, at 2. Free
divorce referred to state laws that broadened the grounds under which either or both the husband
and wife could sue for divorce. (See for example Free Trade in Divorce, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17,
1872, at 4, that describes a proposed bill in New York that would have allowed divorce on the
grounds that one of the parties was “unhappy or uncomfortable.”) Those who opposed divorce
except on the grounds of adultery or extreme cruelty criticized these laws, arguing that they
destroyed the institution of marriage that they insisted was the “foundations of the social order.”
Divorces in Illinois, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 23, 1873, at 6; The World of Amusement, CHIC. TRIB., Jan. 29,
1871, at 2 (arguing that “divorce[] made easy…makes a farce of marriage . . . kills the home . . .
dissevers the family . . . [and] is an outrage upon the child”). See also NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC
VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 106-111 (2000). Proponents of liberal divorce
laws, which included Elizabeth Cady Stanton, argued that denying divorce to women denied their
liberty and caused harm to the family. “Woman’s Right” to Divorce NEW YORK TIMES May 18,
1870 at 2; NORMA BASCH, FRAMING AMERICAN DIVORCE: FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY
GENERATION TO THE VICTORIANS 68-69 (1999).
83. Female Suffrage: Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Illinois Association, CHI.
TRIB., Apr. 19, 1871, at 3; A.J. GROVER, THE BIBLE ARGUMENT AGAINST WOMAN STATED AND
ANSWERED FROM A BIBLE STANDPOINT (1870). Charles Waite similarly challenged Christianity.
Waite, a self described free thinker, wrote a book which he described as a comprehensive view of
the gospels of the first two centuries. CHARLES B. WAITE, HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION
TO THE YEAR TWO HUNDRED, at iii-iv (3d ed. 1881). It necessarily challenged the Bible as it
included what he described as the lost gospels of that time. Id. at 1-15 (Chapter 1, “The Lost
Gospels of the First Century”). The book was published by his wife, Catharine Van Valkenburg
Waite’s, publishing company. Id. at title page. Elizabeth Cady Stanton shared the position of
Grover and Waite that Christianity and the Bible had a deleterious effect on the position of women.
ELLEN CAROL DUBOIS, The Limitations of Sisterhood: Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Division in the
American Suffrage Movement, 1875-1902, in WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS 160, 16364. In 1895, after almost a decade of work, she published the Woman’s Bible. Id. at 164-65 and
170.
84. Woman’s Suffrage: Organization of the Cook County Women’s Franchise Association,
CHI. TRIB., Apr. 6, 1870, at 3; Cook County Organization for Woman Suffrage Formed, THE
REVOLUTION 253 (Apr. 21, 1870). Fernando Jones served as the temporary first chair and
Catharine Waite served as secretary. Charles Waite was also a member of the association. Jane
Graham Jones, wife of Fernando Jones, was subsequently elected as chair and served as president
from 1870 to 1876. From its beginning the association supported Susan B. Anthony. 3 HISTORY OF
WOMAN SUFFRAGE 589 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony & Matilda Joselyn Gage eds.,
1886); Woman’s Suffrage: Meeting of the County Franchise Association, CHI. TRIB., May 15, 1870,
at 3.
85. Woman Suffrage: First Annual Convention of the Cook County Woman Suffrage
Association: Resolutions Offered that Woman is Already Entitled to the Franchise, CHI. TRIB., Mar.
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perhaps one of the acts that precipitated it, Catharine Waite was elected
the new president of the IWSA. 86
The defection was well orchestrated and dramatic. James Bradwell,
as chair of the IWSA executive committee, called a meeting of the
committee for April 18, 1871.87 Neither he nor his wife attended the
meeting, but Elizabeth Babbit did.88 Babbit read a paper signed by the
dissenters, declaring their withdrawal from the organization and
explaining that their decision was based on principle.89 They cited
Grover’s pamphlet and accused Waite and other members on the
committee who were also members of the CCWSA of attempting to
“force us into a union with said association, which published and
officially endorsed a pamphlet which treats the Bible as a collection of
fables . . . [and] its principal speakers are those known to the public as
advocates of free divorce.”90 Bradwell, who at this point was already
being accused of trying to destroy the family because of her attempts to
become a lawyer, could not be associated with this publication or
position.91 She and the others left and the IWSA fell firmly in the hands
of NWSA supporters.92
Myra Bradwell remained committed to securing women’s legal
equality, including woman suffrage, and therefore maintained a
relationship with Catharine Waite and both factions of the fighting
national leaders. It appears that she and her husband had true affection

11, 1871, at 3; Woman Suffrage: Reception to Mrs. Stanton and Miss Anthony: The Former
Addresses a Few Words to Her Friend, CHI. TRIB., June 9, 1871, at 4; see also 3 THE SELECTED
PAPERS OF ELIZABETH CADY STANTON AND SUSAN B. ANTHONY 152, 153 n.5 (Ann D. Gordon ed.,
2003) (reprinting a letter from Anthony to Elizabeth Boynton Harbert urging Harbert to become
President of the IWSA to replace Jones, who had moved to Europe and could no longer lead the
NWSA; with Jones gone, Anthony feared the AWSA sympathizers within the IWSA might take
control of the state association).
86. BUECHLER, supra note 39, at 104.
87. Female Suffrage: Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Illinois Association, CHI.
TRIB., Apr. 19, 1871, at 3.
88. See id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See infra notes 105-108 and accompanying text.
92. Jane Graham Jones succeeded Waite as President of the IWSA. BUECHLER, supra note
39, at 104. Jones was also committed to Anthony. See 3 THE SELECTED PAPERS OF ELIZABETH
CADY STANTON AND SUSAN B. ANTHONY, supra note 85, at 152. There is some evidence that some
of those who left the IWSA started their own suffrage association called the Christian Suffrage
Society, but it does not appear that this society endured for long. See Current Topics, EVERY
SATURDAY: A JOURNAL OF CHOICE READING, May 27, 1871, at 483; Christian Suffrage Society,
CHI. TRIB., Apr. 26, 1871, at 2. It is not known whether either of the Bradwells was associated with
this society.
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for Lucy Stone.93 Although their personal relationships may have been
more strained, Bradwell also maintained a working relationship and
displayed significant respect for Catharine Waite, Susan B. Anthony,
and Elizabeth Cady Stanton.94 Like Anthony and Stanton, Bradwell was
fighting for more than suffrage. In a poem she read to the Illinois Press
Association shortly after she left the IWSA, Bradwell outlined her law
reform agenda. It included securing and advancing women’s right to:
education, work, contract, guardianship, property, inheritance, and
physical protection from a drunken or violent husband.95 Bradwell was
in the middle of her fight to secure her law license and open the
professions to women when she delivered this poem - a fight she waged
with the assistance of Waite, Stanton, Anthony, and a number of other
women’s rights activists.
The fight began just after Bradwell had secured the second Illinois
Married Women’s Property Act and in the midst of her suffrage activism
with the IWSA (before the dissension). She closely followed the events
in the neighboring state of Iowa where, in June 1869, Arabella
Mansfield had become the first woman to secure a state license to
practice law.96 Mansfield had studied law for two years in her brother's
law office.97 Judge Francis Springer, known for his support of the
woman’s rights movement, had encouraged Mansfield to apply for her
license.98 Although the Iowa law regulating the licensing of attorneys to
the bar restricted admission to “white male persons,”99 Springer admitted

93. Bradwell also used the Chicago Legal News presses to serve as the Woman’s Journal’s
western agent, publishing the paper every Saturday. The Woman’s Journal, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Jan.
15, 1870, at 124. Lucy Stone, Mary Livermore, and Julia Ward Howe, all leaders of the AWSA,
were the editors of the Journal. Id.
94. Before the split, Bradwell met with Elizabeth Cady Stanton in Springfield, Illinois in late
February 1869 and described her as one of the “great apostles” of the woman suffrage movement.
Suffrage and Springfield, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Feb. 27, 1869, at 172. She met with Susan B.
Anthony in Chicago in March, 1870. Susan B. Anthony, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Mar. 12, 1870, at 188.
She described the encounter as “a very pleasant visit” and published her full support for Anthony’s
proposed sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Id. After Bradwell left the IWSA she attended
at least two national meetings of the NWSA. See Washington, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Dec. 1872, at 2;
The Women, CHI. DAILY TRIB., May 7, 1879, at 3. Bradwell and Anthony also exchanged a handful
of letters from 1873 to 1888 that reflected their continued, albeit strained, relationship. FRIEDMAN,
supra note 13, at 184-89.
95. Mrs. Bradwell’s Poem, CHI. TRIB., July 2, 1871, at 2.
96. MORELLO, supra note 4, at 11.
97. Louis A. Haselmayer, Belle A. Mansfield, 55 WOMEN LAWYERS J. 46 (1969); Dorothy
Thomas, Arabella Mansfield, in NOTABLE AMERICAN WOMEN 1607-1950: A BIOGRAPHICAL
DICTIONARY 492, 493 (Edward T. James ed., 1971).
98. See Thomas, supra note 97, at 493.
99. Haselmayer, supra note 97, at 47.
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Mansfield to the bar, making her the first licensed woman lawyer in the
country.100 Bradwell prominently celebrated Mansfield’s admission in
the Chicago Legal News.101 Myra Bradwell applied for her Illinois law
license three months later, in September 1869.102 She applied in part
because she wanted to practice law, but Bradwell also applied to
advance the broader cause of women’s rights.103
III. BRADWELL’S CASE AS A STRATEGY IN THE WOMEN’S RIGHTS
MOVEMENT
Bradwell’s application and subsequent lawsuit were part of her
lifelong fight to secure women’s legal equality. Bradwell was not a
radical. She believed in liberal individualism, Christianity, and
marriage.104 What she denounced was the concept of separate spheres
and the laws, doctrines, and social practices that limited women’s
citizenship rights. That is why twenty years after she first filed her
application, she was still angry at those who had openly questioned her
ability to be a lawyer because she was a woman and chastised her for
attempting to leave her rightful place as wife and mother.105 “All the
wiseacres of the land,” she explained, “made doleful prophecies
concerning the end of my career . . . [and] predicted that I’d wreck my
family and break my hearthstone to smithereens.”106 Two decades later
it was still important to her to prove them wrong: “I often wish all those
excellent folk who used to picture me as a fanatic destroyer of
domesticity and the sweetness of true womanhood could see my two

100. Mansfield used her legal expertise to advance the women’s rights movement in Iowa.
Haselmayer, supra note 97, at 49 (quoting a letter from John Mansfield published in the IOWA
CLASSIC, Dec. 1872, at 17). In August of 1870 she drafted a “Constitution for the Henry County
Woman Suffrage Association.” Id. She continued to teach as well as give various lectures on legal
issues such as “The Principles of Government” and “The Origin of Law” and furthered her legal
education at Iowa Wesleyan University receiving her Bachelor of Laws degree in June 1872. Id. In
1872-73 she studied English, Hindu, and Muslim law in London and Paris. Id. At the first national
meeting of women lawyers that occurred at the Isabella Clubhouse in Chicago during the World's
Fair of 1893, Mansfield gave an address on her admission to the bar and was given an honorary
membership to the National League of Women Lawyers founded during the Fair. Id.
101. A Married Woman Admitted to the Bar in Iowa, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Oct. 16, 1869, at 20.
102. A Woman Cannot Practice Law or Hold Any Office in Illinois, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Feb. 5,
1870, at 145. Bradwell received her certification of examination from Judge E.S. Williams on
August 2, 1869. Id.
103. All Dabble in the Law, supra note 41.
104. Friedman, supra note 13, at 37.
105. See id. at 40.
106. All Dabble in the Law, supra note 41; Friedman, supra note 13, at 40.
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daughters and our homelife.”107 Bradwell had never fought against
marriage or motherhood, but she had always argued that being a wife
and mother should not limit a woman’s citizenship status or be a barrier
to a woman working in her chosen profession.108 Bradwell wanted equal
rights, not revolution.
A. Bradwell’s Equal Protection Argument and Her Contribution
Toward the Development of Sociological Jurisprudence
Bradwell ultimately lost her case, but by her own assessment, her
efforts helped to dismantle the doctrine of separate spheres and her legal
arguments were an important contribution to the women’s rights
movement.109 These arguments and her innovation in jurisprudence
were all set forth in her case at the state level.110 She developed them in
concert with other women’s rights activists as the case progressed.
Bradwell filed three briefs to the Illinois Supreme Court in support of
her application for a license to practice law. Each one offered
increasingly sophisticated arguments that incorporated and developed
the contemporaneous events and arguments set forth by other women’s
rights activists.
The first brief accompanied her initial application.111 The brief was
not required by statute but Bradwell submitted it along with the required
documents, a certificate of legal study and proof of successful
completion of the state bar examination. Because she was the first
woman to apply for a license in the state, Bradwell wanted to reassure
the justices that her application was legally proper. She stated simply
that she met the statutory requirements and therefore her sex should not
prohibit her from entering her chosen profession. She acknowledged
that the governing statute used the male pronoun in its recitation of
requirements to enter the bar, but argued that it was not an explicit
requirement that the applicant be male.112 She cited as evidence the
107. All Dabble in the Law, supra note 41. Bradwell was referring to her daughter Bessie
Bradwell Helmer, an attorney, and her daughter-in law, Hattie Burton Bradwell. Bessie and Hattie
were close friends in school. Id. Both women lived with their husbands, Frank Helmer and Thomas
Bradwell, both attorneys, in James and Myra Bradwell’s home in Chicago. Id.
108. FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 37; see Aynes, supra note 9, at 536.
109. All Dabble in the Law, supra note 41 (“The world, too, has begun to learn the lesson that
it is not necessary for a woman to break up all family ties and sacrifice womanly attributes and
graces in order to succeed in other trades than the honored one of housewife.”) (quoting Myra
Bradwell).
110. See In re Bradwell, 55 Ill. 535 (1869).
111. See A Woman Cannot Practice Law or Hold Any Office in Illinois, supra note 102, at 145.
112. Bradwell quotes the Illinois law as:
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Illinois statute that specified “[w]hen any party or person is described or
referred to by words importing the masculine gender, females as well as
males shall be deemed to be included.”113 Bradwell also cited other
examples in the statutes where the court would have to interpret the male
pronoun “he” to include women to avoid an absurd result.114
It was in Bradwell’s second brief that she began to invoke
arguments that included what would become tenets of sociological
jurisprudence.115 She wrote this brief in response to the Illinois court’s
initial denial of her application.116 The decision came in a short letter
sent by the court reporter, stating that the court denied her application
based on the laws of coverture.117 She used new statutes, other court
decisions, examples of women’s social progress, and her own special
situation to argue that the laws of coverture no longer applied.118 She
asserted that in light of these changes the court must reconsider and
grant her application.119
Bradwell first asked the judges to consider the new laws and court
decisions that granted women property rights as a changed circumstance
that should affect their interpretation of the law governing law
licenses.120 Bradwell insisted that the two Illinois Married Women's
Property Acts, passed in 1861 and 1869 that allowed women to enter
into contracts and own their own wages, invalidated the rule of

No person shall be permitted to practice as an attorney or counselor-at-law, or to
commence, conduct or defend any action, suit or plaint, in which he is not a party
concerned, in any court of record within his State, either by using or subscribing his own
name or the name of any other person without having previously obtained a license for
that purpose from some two of the Justices of the Supreme Court, which license shall
constitute the person receiving the same an attorney and counselor-at-law, and shall
authorize him to appear in all courts of record within this state, and there to practice as
an attorney and counselor-at law, according to the laws and customs thereof . . . .
A Woman Cannot Practice Law, supra note 102, at 145.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Adam Winkler describes these arguments as “living constitutionalism.” Adam Winkler, A
Revolution Too Soon: Woman Suffragists and the “Living Constitution,” 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1456,
1463 (2001) (explaining that Living Constitutionalism requires that the Constitution must be
interpreted “in light of society’s changing needs and conditions rather than solely the Framers’
intent”); BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF JUDICIAL PROCESS 82-83 (1921).
116. A Woman Cannot Practice Law or Hold Any Office in Illinois, supra note 102, at 145.
117. The letter from the Supreme Court Reporter was dated October 6, 1869. Id. Bradwell
filed her second brief on November 18, 1869. Id.
118. Id. at 145-46.
119. Id. at 146.
120. Id. at 145-46.
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coverture.121 She also cited a number of court decisions in Illinois, other
states, and in England, which she contended were precedents that
supported the changed legal and social position of married women,
specifically the condition that women could contract and engage in
business dealing.122 Bradwell also reminded the court that the Illinois
legislature had granted her a special charter to own and operate the
Chicago Legal News.123 These arguments, using new statutes and court
decisions as persuasive precedents to illustrate changed social and legal
circumstances, became a common strategy of sociological jurisprudence
in the twentieth century.124
Bradwell next asked the justices to consider the current social
conditions when interpreting the Illinois licensing statute. She set forth
these changes by describing the many advances women had made in
public life:
The doors of many of our universities and law schools are now open to
women upon an equality with men. The Government of the United
States has employed women in many of its departments, and appointed
many, both single and married, to office. Almost every large city in
the Union has its regularly admitted female physicians. . . . The bar
itself is not without its women lawyers, both single and married.125

Bradwell then described the details of Arabella Mansfield’s law license
application and Judge Springer’s interpretation that the use of the word
“male” in the Iowa statute was “not an implied denial of the right to
females.”126
Bradwell offered both Mansfield’s admission and
Springer’s interpretation of the Iowa statute as precedent-setting changes
in the social and legal position of women and asked the court to interpret
and apply the Illinois law to her case in line with these changes.127
Bradwell developed her argument by drawing on the strategies of
instrumentalism that had developed during the antebellum period and
were being challenged by legal classicists. Legal classicism was the

121. Id. at 146; Olsen, supra note 6, at 1524. Bradwell also argued that for her in particular,
coverture was not a barrier to her ability to engage in business transactions since the Illinois
legislature had granted her a special charter to operate the Chicago Legal News.
122. A Woman Cannot Practice Law or Hold Any Office in Illinois, supra note 102, at 145-46.
123. Id.
124. Winkler, supra note 115, at 1481, 1482 n.141.
125. A Woman Cannot Practice Law or Hold Any Office in Illinois, supra note 102, at 146.
However, at this time Iowan Mansfield, a married woman, was the only woman admitted to any
state bar in the United States.
126. Id. at 146.
127. Id.
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form of judicial interpretation that believed the Constitution was based
on “concepts and principles [that] were static and unchanging” and
required judges to interpret the Constitution based on the original intent
of those who drafted and enacted it.128 Legal classicism opposed the
early nineteenth century practice of some state court judges who had
used the law to advance economic policies that supported
entrepreneurial growth and expansion, interpreting the laws in light of
the current social and economic circumstances.129 In opposition to legal
classicism, Bradwell invoked the strategy of the instrumentalists, but
transformed their ends from supporting a Hurstian release of energy130 to
advance a nascent notion of social justice.131 She urged the court not to
enforce some outdated common law doctrine or to interpret a statute
from the perspective of those who enacted it , but rather to interpret the
law in light of the changed social conditions of women and grant her a
license to practice law “as a matter of right and justice.”132
The connection between Bradwell’s arguments and instrumentalism
is explicit in her brief. She specifically invoked the words of the
instrumentalist, English jurist, Lord Mansfield, citing a case where
Mansfield had ruled that regardless of the prescriptions of common law
there were exceptions when a married woman could contract and be
sued.133
Lord Mansfield intended his decision to advance the free
market, not woman’s rights, but Bradwell contended that his decision
also supported the contention that the law must adapt to the changing
social circumstances of women’s position.134 As evidence she quoted
Mansfield’s assessment that when “the reason of the law [ceased], the
law itself must cease; and that, as the usages of society alter, the law

128. Morton J. Horowitz, Transformation of Constitutional Law, in 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 2712 (Leonard W. Levy & Kenneth L. Karst eds., 2d ed. 2000); Paul W.
Kahn, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY: SELF-GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
32-64 (1992); Winkler, supra note 115, at 1463; WIECEK supra note 8, at 19.
129. WIECEK, supra note 8, at 44; see also MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 178-80 (1977); William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery
Movement Upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV.
513, 521-24 (1974).
130. J. WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTHCENTURY UNITED STATES (1956). Hurst argued that in the United States in the nineteenth century,
men used the law affirmatively “to promote the greater release of individual or group energies” to
advance material and economic growth. Id. at 7.
131. I am indebted to James Schmidt for helping to develop this insight into social justice.
132. A Woman Cannot Practice Law or Hold Any Office in Illinois, supra note 102, at 146.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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must adapt itself to the various situations of mankind.”135 Bradwell
merely changed the goal of the instrumentalist approach from economic
expansion to her gendered justice.
These pre-sociological jurisprudence arguments are echoed in the
arguments of Justices and legal scholars credited with developing
concepts of sociological jurisprudence, legal realism, and living
constitutionalism.136 In the last two decades of the nineteenth century,
Oliver Wendell Holmes, (who some call the father of legal realism)
published treatises challenging the notion of legal interpretation as
objective and detached from social realities.137 In the first decade of the
twentieth century, Roscoe Pound conceived the term “sociological
jurisprudence,” issued a call for “pragmatism as a philosophy of law,”138
and advocated the concept that the law should be used to achieve social
In the 1920s, Benjamin Cardozo advocated living
justice.139
constitutionalism, explaining that the “content of constitutional
immunities is not constant, but varies from age to age.”140 Although
none of these men referenced Bradwell, their writings developed the
arguments she set forth in her second brief to the Illinois Supreme Court
in November 1869.
Bradwell did not cultivate this reasoning on her own. She worked
in consultation with other women’s rights activists who were also
employing this approach in attempts to influence the interpretation of
various state laws and the new U.S. Constitutional amendments.141
135. Id.
136. See infra notes 137-140 and accompanying text.
137. See HORWITZ, supra note 30, at 3, 109-10, 142; HALL, supra note 30, at 223. See Oliver
Wendell Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
138. WIECEK, supra note 8, at 191-93. See Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8
COLUM. L. REV. 605, 609 (1908).
139. See Pound, supra note 138; see generally Roscoe Pound, The Need of a Sociological
Jurisprudence, in 19 GREEN BAG 607 (1907); see also WIECEK, supra note 8, at 191-93.
140. CARDOZO, supra note 115, at 82-83.
141. Although there are no known correspondences between Bradwell and Stanton specifically
discussing this argument of judicial interpretation, there is evidence that the two women interacted
during this period and there is a letter Anthony wrote to Bradwell in 1873 after her prosecution for
voting in which she asks Bradwell “What are we going to do or say next?” and writes “How I would
love to talk of our Constitutional position and work for the future.” FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at
184 (letter from Anthony to Bradwell dated July 30, 1873). This letter was written after Bradwell
withdrew from the IWSA. It offers the possibility that Bradwell and Anthony had previously talked
about their constitutional arguments. This possibility is supported by the similarities in the
arguments of Bradwell, Stanton, and Minor three years earlier, before the splintering of the IWSA.
Further, Anthony published an article on October 7, 1869 announcing that Bradwell was about to
apply for her law license. What Women are Doing, THE REVOLUTION 218 (Oct. 7 1869). Bradwell
had just submitted the application in October and just received the letter from the Court Reporter
denying her application. Bradwell had not yet published this information in the Chicago Legal
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Adam Winkler has identified that the New Departure strategy of women
suffragists included arguments that the Constitution was a living
document and that it be interpreted in light of the changed social and
political circumstances.142 According to Winkler, Elizabeth Cady
Stanton publicly articulated this position in January 1870 while
testifying before the Senate Committee on the District of Columbia. She
was arguing in favor of a petition to grant women suffrage.143
Stanton’s arguments, like Bradwell’s, described democracy and law
as evolutionary.144 She first claimed that the underlying principles of the
Constitution required that its provisions apply to all its citizens.145 She
then offered examples of the changed social and legal circumstances of
women and argued that these changes required that the legislature grant
women the right to vote.146 Specifically, she cited the recent Supreme
Court decision that held that when a foreign born woman married a man
born in the United States, she became a citizen.147 Stanton reasoned that
this means a woman born in the United State is already a citizen and
therefore entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizenship.148
Although, like Bradwell, her arguments did not persuade her audience to
grant the demand she sought, her arguments were important to the
movement.
Both Bradwell and Stanton also supplemented their presociological arguments with a textual interpretation argument that
Stanton described as the New Departure.149 Ellen Carol DuBois credits
Frances and Virginia Minor with the origins of the New Departure
argument, which asserted that women were already enfranchised
because the right to vote was one of the privileges and immunities of
U.S. citizens protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.150 The Minors
first publicly articulated this argument in the form of six resolutions at a

News. Bradwell submitted her second brief to the Illinois Supreme Court on November 16, 1869,
but she did not publish copy of it until February 5, 1870. See A Woman Cannot Practice Law or
Hold Any Office in Illinois, supra note 102, at 146. Stanton made her argument to the Senate
Committee on the District of Columbia in January 1870. Winkler, supra note 115, at 1479.
142. Winkler, supra note 115, at 1457-58, 1479.
143. Id. at 1479.
144. Id. at 1480, 1483; 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 407-520 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton,
Susan B. Anthony & Matilda Joselyn Gage eds., 1881).
145. Winkler, supra note 115, at 1480.
146. Id. at 1480-81.
147. See Kelly v. Owen, 74 U.S. 496 (1868).
148. 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 144, at 412; see Kelly, 74 U.S. at 496.
149. DuBois, supra note 13, at 21; Winkler, supra note 115, at 1476.
150. DuBois, supra note 13, at 21-22.
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state suffrage convention held on October 6 and 7, 1869 in Missouri.151
Three weeks later, on October 28, 1869, Anthony published their
resolutions in The Revolution and delivered ten thousand copies to
activists and politicians throughout the country.152
Myra Bradwell drew on their argument and adapted it for use in her
own case.153 On December 31, 1869 she submitted her third and final
brief to the Illinois Supreme Court, this time resting a woman’s right to
practice law on the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article Four and
the Civil Rights Act of 1866.154 Unlike the Minors, and the argument
her attorney would make on her appeal, Bradwell did not make a claim
based on the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.155 Rather, she asserted that the denial of her application on
the basis of her status as a married woman violated her United States
citizenship rights established by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the 1866 Civil Rights Act.156 Like Minor,
she argued that the court should employ a broad interpretation of the
new laws.157
In her brief, Bradwell drew heavily on both the Equal Protection
Clause and the Civil Rights Act.158 She argued that the Act guaranteed
all United States citizens the “full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property.”159 Bradwell
asserted both the Act and the Equal Protection Clause granted her “the
right to exercise and follow the profession of an attorney-at-law upon the
same terms, conditions and restrictions as are applied to and imposed
upon every other citizen of the State of Illinois and none other.”160
151. 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 144, at 407-10.
152. PAPERS, supra note 74, at 273-75; Winkler, supra note 115, at 1476-77; 2 HISTORY OF
WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 144, at 411. Although Minor’s argument did not include the new
method of constitutional interpretation that included consideration of changed social circumstance,
it did call for a broad interpretation of the Constitution and it included a plea for justice. Dear
Revolution (Letter by Francis Minor), THE REVOLUTION (Oct. 21, 1869); PAPERS, supra note 74, at
275 (“That justice and equity can only be attained by having the same laws for men and women
alike.” (Francis Minor to the Revolution, Resolution 5, Oct. 14, 1869)). Suffragists quickly seized
on the New Departure argument and put it into practice by demanding the vote. DUBOIS, supra note
23, at 117-18.
153. DuBois, supra note 13, at 30.
154. See Gilliam, supra note 8, at 114.
155. Bradwell filed the second brief on January 2, 1870. A Woman Cannot Practice Law or
Hold Any Office in Illinois, supra note 102, at 146. Gilliam, supra note 8, at 114.
156. Gilliam, supra note 8, at 114.
157. See id.
158. See notes 154 and 156 and accompanying text.
159. A Woman Cannot Practice Law or Hold Any Office in Illinois, supra note 102, at 146.
160. Id.
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Bradwell reasoned that because she complied with all of the state
requirements for admission to the bar, “it is contrary to the true intent
and meaning of said amendment and said ‘Civil Rights Bill,’ for your
petitioner to be refused a license to practice law, upon the sole ground of
her ‘married condition.’”161 Although she rested her case on alternate
constitutional and legal provisions, her argument followed the New
Departure reasoning.162
She also made a claim based on the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Fourth Article of the Constitution, again asking the court
to employ a broad interpretation of that clause.163 She submitted an
affidavit attesting that she was born in Vermont and argued she was
therefore a citizen of that state and the United States.164 She asserted
that under this Article as a citizen of another state, Illinois was required
to grant her all the privileges and immunities of a United States
citizen.165 She then listed her assessment of what rights were included in
the privileges and immunities of citizenship, a list dramatically different
than the one the U.S. Supreme Court would construct in its interpretation
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
on her appeal.166 Bradwell’s list included general rights, like “the
protection of the Government, the right to the enjoyment of life and
liberty, [and] to reside in the State.”167 It also included rights that she
had spent much of her adult life fighting to ensure were extended to
women, including the right “to acquire and possess property,” and “to
carry on trade,” and her immediate fight “to follow any professional
pursuit under the laws of the State.”168 She demanded that these rights
“must work equally upon all citizens of the State,” concluding that
“under this section of the Constitution she has a right to receive a license
to practice law upon the same terms and conditions as the most favored
citizen of the State of Illinois.”169 Three weeks later, Elizabeth Cady
Stanton made similar arguments in her appeal for woman suffrage. 170

161. Id.
162. See id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Stanton spoke at the Joint Hearing before the District of D.C. Committees on January 22,
1870. PAPERS, supra note 74, at 296.
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In her address to the Senate Committee on the District of Columbia
on January 22, 1870, discussed above, Stanton incorporated New
Departure textual interpretation arguments together with her use of presociological jurisprudence.171 She employed Francis Minor’s resolutions
and argued that the right to vote was one of the privileges and
immunities protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.172 Like Bradwell,
she used the changed social and legal circumstance of women and the
evolution of the Constitution to support her call for this broad
interpretation. Although both women lost their immediate appeals, their
efforts introduced these new legal arguments into the public discourse.173
Other women’s rights activists drew on their innovations in their
continued fight for women’s civil and political rights.
An example that garnered significant public attention occurred one
year later, when Victoria Woodhull employed these two innovations in
her argument to the United States Congress in support of woman
suffrage.174 Although Woodhull had not previously worked with either
Stanton or Bradwell, she echoed their arguments that the law must be
interpreted in line with the evolving social and legal circumstances and
specifically cited the advance in women’s property rights as evidence of
such evolution.175 Woodhull also introduced the concept of justice as
both evidence of social change and as a legitimate legislative goal,
claiming that “the principle of justice and moral right ha[d] gained
sway”176 and demanding the Congress interpret the existing
Constitutional provisions in light of these advances and pass a
declaratory act acknowledging women’s enfranchisement.177 Shortly
after her appearance, Woodhull was plagued by scandal, and she was not
able to continue to publicly advance her arguments.178 But her
testimony had drawn considerable attention to the cause and others

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.
Winkler, supra note 115, at 1480.
Id. at 1483.
GOLDSMITH, supra note 82 at 248-55.
Id. at 247; Winkler, supra note 115, at 1484; ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS:
CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 338 (1997). Woodhull was an outspoken
supporter of free love and divorce, aligning her with Stanton and in opposition to Bradwell.
GOLDSMITH, supra note 82, at 248-49. It is not known whether Woodhull had either read or heard
of Bradwell or Stanton’s arguments.
176. Winkler, supra note 115, at 1485 (quoting Victoria C. Woodhull’s testimony before the
Judiciary Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives of the Congress of the United
States).
177. GOLDSMITH, supra note 82, at 248; Winkler, supra note 115, at 1484, 1489.
178. GOLDSMITH, supra note 82, at 255; see Winkler, supra note 115, at 1520 n.383.
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continued to employ these arguments, most prominently Susan B.
Anthony.179
Anthony used these arguments in her defense in the case of the
United States v. Susan B. Anthony.180 Anthony had been charged with
voting illegally.181 The judge presiding over Anthony’s case deemed her
incompetent to testify because she was a woman. Anthony, therefore,
had her attorney, Henry Selden, speak for her.182 He set forth both the
New Departure argument that called for a broad textual interpretation,
and the pre-sociological jurisprudence argument that demanded that the
court consider the changed social and legal circumstances in interpreting
the law.183 Selden argued that evolution of society, and women’s
position within it, supported women’s enfranchisement.184
Like
Bradwell, Stanton, and Woodhull before him, Selden used the Married
Women’s Property Acts to support women’s changed condition.185 He
challenged the ideals of legal classicism and the use of originalism that
required judges to discern the intent of the Framers and apply the law as
if it were static.186 Like the others before him, Selden lost his case, but
his arguments advanced the new methods of interpretation, which had
for the first time been set forth by a man.187
Bradwell’s direct influence is most visible in the arguments offered
by other women lawyers who invoked her words in support of their own
law license applications. In the neighboring state of Wisconsin, Lavinia
Goodell applied for a license to practice law before the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in 1875.188 She offered a plethora of arguments invoking

179. See United States v. Anthony, 24 F. Cas. 829 (N.D.N.Y. 1873).
180. Id.
181. Winkler, supra note 115, at 1506; FLEXNER & FITZPATRICK, supra note 26, at 159;
SMITH, supra note 175, at 341.
182. 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 144, at 653.
183. Id. at 657-58.
184. Id.; Winkler, supra note 115, at 1509.
185. 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 144, at 657-58.
186. Winkler, supra note 115, at 1511-12; 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 144,
at 667-68.
187. Winkler, supra note 115, at 1512, 1514; 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note
144, at 691; FLEXNER & FITZPATRICK, supra note 26, at 159-60; SMITH, supra note 175, at 341.
Bradwell published the decision in Anthony’s case and then wrote two editorial notes criticizing the
decision, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, June 21, 1873, at 466 and CHI. LEGAL NEWS, July 19, 1873, at 498.
188. See, e.g., Mrs. Lockwood’s Case, 11 CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Nov. 16, 1878, at 70 (Bradwell’s
publishing of Lockwood’s letter to Bradwell, the details of Lockwood’s case, and Bradwell’s
commitment to support her; Lockwood’s letter pledging to finish the fight Bradwell started to allow
women to practice law and asking for her help in her application to practice law in Maryland). See
infra notes 194-195 for Bradwell’s support of Goodell’s application to practice law in Wisconsin
and Lockwood’s application to practice law before the United States Supreme Court.
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notions of equality as well as gender difference (that she asserted would
enhance women’s ability to practice law) 189 and interwove arguments
that employed classical legal reasoning, the New Departure, and preShe asserted that the
sociological jurisprudence arguments.190
Wisconsin legislature had not intended to exclude women when it
enacted the state’s licensing regulations just five years earlier. She
explained that the laws were passed “when progressive ideas concerning
the enlargement of the sphere of woman’s industries were more widely
known and adopted”191 and reasoned that therefore it “may reasonably
be presumed to have been within the minds of the legislators” that
women would be admitted.192 She also cited recently enacted laws that
advanced the legal position of women, including the state’s Married
Women’s Property Acts and the changes that had occurred since the
Illinois Supreme Court rendered its decision in Bradwell’s case.193
Goodell lost her initial suit, but the case received considerable attention,
primarily because Chief Justice Ryan’s opinion articulated his horror of
a woman in the same terms Justice Bradley had used two years earlier.194
The following year, Belva Lockwood took women’s fight to
practice law, and Bradwell’s arguments, back to the United States
Supreme Court and to Congress. She worked closely with Bradwell,
who documented the events in the Chicago Legal News.195 Lockwood,
who was already licensed to practice law in the District of Columbia,
sought to be admitted to practice law before the United States Supreme
Court. 196 She engaged the assistance of attorney Albert Riddle, a strong
supporter of women’s rights who had used these new interpretation
189. See Catherine B. Cleary, Lavinia Goodell: First Woman Lawyer in Wisconsin, 74 WISC.
MAG. OF HIST. 243 (1991). See VIRGINIA G. DRACHMAN, SISTERS IN LAW: WOMEN LAWYERS IN
MODERN AMERICAN HISTORY 22-23 (1998).
190. Can a Woman Practice Law in Wisconsin?, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Jan. 1, 1876, at 116.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See id.
194. See infra notes 252-255 and accompanying text. In re Goodell 39 Wis. 232 (1875). For
contemporary discussions of the case see Should Women Practice Law in Wisconsin, 8 CHI. LEGAL
NEWS 215 (March 25, 1876) (where Bradwell dissects Ryan’s opinion); Women as Lawyers--Mrs.
Goodell’s Case, THE CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL, Mar. 24, 1876, at 186 (arguing that women should
have the chance to practice law); Editorial Notes, INDEP., Mar. 23, 1876, at 16 (describing Ryan’s
decision as “stupid, illiberal, and mean”).
195. See Shall Women Be Admitted to Practice Law in the Federal Courts?, CHI. LEGAL NEWS,
Mar. 23, 1878, at 215; Shall Women Be Admitted to the Bar?, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Mar. 30, 1878, at
224-25; The Admission of Women to the Bar, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Feb.15, 1879; Women as Lawyers,
CHI. LEGAL NEWS, May 11, 1878, at 271-72; Women’s Right to Practice in the U.S. Courts, CHI.
LEGAL NEWS, Feb. 10, 1877, at 169.
196. See MORELLO, supra note 4, at 31, 33.
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arguments five years earlier while representing two women who
unsuccessfully sued the District of Columbia Board of Electors for
refusing to allow them to vote.197
Lockwood invoked the new method of interpretation immediately
in her response to her initial rejection by Chief Justice Morrison R.
Waite. Waite noted that only men had ever been admitted to the
Supreme Court bar and therefore precedent barred her application.198
Lockwood rejected his reasoning, asserting that “it was the glory of each
generation to make its own precedents.”199 She then took her appeal to
Congress.
Lockwood drafted a bill that granted women the right to be
admitted to practice law on the same grounds as men and argued that the
changed social conditions and the current position of woman required its
passage.200 In 1878, the House of Representatives passed the bill but it
stalled in the Senate.201 She submitted a brief to the Senate encouraging
it to act in accordance with the demands of the age: “This country is one
that has not hesitated when the necessity has arisen to make precedents”
she wrote, “the more extended practice and the more extended public
opinion [supporting women lawyers] . . . has already been accomplished.
Ah! That very opinion . . . [is] asking you for that special act now so
nearly consummated, which shall open this door of labor to women.”202
California Senator Aaron Sargent, a longtime supporter of woman’s
rights and a close friend of Susan B. Anthony’s, took up Lockwood’s
fight.203
Sargent followed Bradwell’s lead in his arguments to his fellow
senators. He claimed that women were citizens and then listed the social

197. Winkler, supra note 115, at 1497; 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 144, at
587-94.
198. See MORELLO, supra note 4, at 33; DRACHMAN, supra note 189, at 27; FAIRMAN, supra
note 8, at 1366. See also Jill Norgren, Before It Was Merely Difficult: Belva Lockwood’s Life in
Law and Politics, 23 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 16, 29 (1999); Lee Ann Potter, A Bill to Relieve Certain
Legal Disabilities of Women, 66 SOC. EDUC. 117, 119 (2002).
199. Frances A. Cook, Belva Ann Lockwood: For Peace, Justice, and President, May 13, 1997,
available at http://stanford.edu/group/WLHP/papers/lockwood.
200. See Shall Women Be Admitted to the Bar?, supra note 195, at 225.
201. See MORELLO, supra note 4, at 34; see also Mrs. Lockwood’s Victory, CHI. LEGAL NEWS,
Mar. 2, 1878, at 191; Women’s Right to Practice in the U.S. Courts, supra note 195, at 169.
202. Bella Lockwood, In Support of House Bill 1077, Entitled “A Bill to Relieve Certain
Disabilities of Women,” in JAMES KIRBY, 1 THE LEGAL NEWS 185 (1878).
203. See MORELLO, supra note 4, at 34; Mrs. Lockwood’s Victory, supra note 197, at 91;
Women’s Right to Practice in the U.S. Courts, supra note 195, at 169.
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and legal evolutions that had advanced their condition.204 He invoked
the names of accomplished women from a diversity of occupations and
professions, including women lawyers.205 He cited the state laws that
had advanced women’s legal rights, including the many states that
already admitted women to their bars.206 He also submitted petitions
signed by lawyers in both New York and the District of Columbia that
supported women’s admission to the Supreme Court bar, which
supported Lockwood’s claim that there was popular support for the
bill.207 The Senate acquiesced and enacted the law in February 1879.208
In a moment of great triumph, Lockwood was admitted to the Supreme
Court bar on March 3, 1879.209
B. The Illinois and United States Supreme Court Decisions in
Bradwell’s Case
Bradwell lost her case at both the state and federal level. The
Illinois Supreme Court rejected the arguments she set forth in her three
briefs. The U.S. Supreme Court never even heard her arguments.
Although Bradwell keenly suffered the defeat, these decisions did not
dissuade the continued use and development of either the presociological arguments or the New Departure. They were not even
definitive on the issue of women securing their law licenses. Rather,
they represent both courts’ attempts to stay the evolution of democracy
that was moving toward the demise of the ideology and practice of
separate spheres.
The Illinois Supreme Court discussed its fear of women’s progress
in its opinion. It first stated definitively that married or not, no woman
could be admitted to the Illinois bar and summarily dismissed
Bradwell’s constitutional claims.210 Then, it rested the decision on its
horror of a woman.211 The court was acutely aware and openly afraid of
204. Women as Lawyers, supra note 195, at 272. Throughout Sargent’s political and legal
career, he was a champion of women’s rights. A close friend of Susan B. Anthony’s, in 1878 he
introduced the “Anthony Amendment” to Congress, the woman suffrage amendment that was
ultimately enacted as the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920. FLEXNER & FITZPATRICK, supra note
26, at 165.
205. See Women as Lawyers, supra note 195, at 272.
206. The Admission of Women to the Bar, supra note 195, at 181.
207. See id.
208. See id.; 20 Stat. 292 (1879).
209. VIRGINIA G. DRACHMAN, WOMEN LAWYERS AND THE ORIGINS OF PROFESSIONAL
IDENTITY IN AMERICA 243 (1993).
210. See A Woman Cannot Practice Law or Hold Any Office in Illinois, supra note 102, at 147.
211. See id.
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the woman’s rights movement’s quest for legal equality and the social
upheaval that it believed would follow if the movement succeeded.
Chief Justice Charles B. Lawrence explained that “this step [admitting
Bradwell to the bar], if taken by us, would mean that, in the opinion of
this tribunal, every civil office in this State may be filled by women; that
it is in harmony with the spirit of our constitution and laws that women
should be made governors, judges and sheriffs. This we are not yet
prepared to hold.”212 The court tried to put the matter to rest by adding,
insincerely, “[i]f the legislature shall choose to remove the existing
barriers and authorize us to issue licenses equally to men and women we
shall cheerfully obey . . . .”213
But there was growing support for women holding political office
and working in the profession. Within two years, the Illinois legislature
removed its barriers. The tide was turning and the justices felt it. Their
pronouncements were defensive attempts to hold off the tide, rather than
reflections of the general consensus. But the Illinois court dealt a
significant blow to the movement and Bradwell understood this. She
described the court’s decision as a denial of women’s citizenship. She
charged, “what the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in
the Dred Scott case was to the rights of negroes as citizens of the United
States, this decision is to the political rights of women in Illinois –
annihilation.”214 Bradwell then took her case to the U.S. Supreme
Court.215
Bradwell did not represent herself in her appeal. Instead, she hired
Matthew Carpenter, a well-known attorney, U.S. Senator, and woman
suffrage supporter to argue her case to the United States Supreme
Court.216 Bradwell wanted her case cast as a woman’s rights case and
framed in the broadest terms. She wanted the Supreme Court to rule that
212. In re Bradwell, 55 Ill. 535 (1869). See also Olsen, supra note 6, at 1518-41.
213. A Woman Cannot Practice Law or Hold Any Office in Illinois, supra note 102, at 147. In
addition to the Bradwell case, Justice Lawrence received strong criticism in his opinion in The
People vs. Charles L. Wilson and Andrew Shuman in 1875. See 3 A[LFRED] T[HEODORE]
ANDREAS, HISTORY OF CHICAGO, 1839-1900, at 252 (1975). The proprietor and the editor of the
Chicago Evening Journal had published a column criticizing the lax treatment murderers received
in the criminal courts. Id. The Supreme Court issued contempt citations against them and had them
arrested. Id. Chief Justice Lawrence found them in contempt and fined them $100 and $200
respectively. Id. Newspapers throughout America and Europe commented negatively on the court's
actions and Andreas wrote, “The action of Judge Lawrence in the case undoubtedly contributed to
his defeat as a candidate for re-election to the Supreme Bench the following year.” Id.
214. A Woman Cannot Practice Law or Hold Any Office in Illinois, supra note 102, at 147; see
also BUECHLER, supra note 39, at 64.
215. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130 (1873).
216. Gilliam, supra note 8, at 117.
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that the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act established
women as full citizens entitled to all rights, privileges, and obligations of
citizenship and to the equal protection of the law. But Carpenter did not
comply with Bradwell’s intentions. He did not consult with Bradwell
prior to submitting his brief or presenting his oral argument before the
Court.217
Carpenter was also the attorney for the Crescent City SlaughterHouse company in Slaughter House Cases.218 He argued in the
Slaughter-House case that the law granting the monopoly was proper
under the state police power.219 In Bradwell’s case, he followed the
argument of his opponent in the Slaughter-House case, former Supreme
Court Justice John Campbell, and argued that the right to work, which he
labeled the liberty of pursuit, was one of the fundamental rights included
in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.220 He did not present Bradwell’s argument that the Illinois
court’s denial of her law license violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment or the 1866 Civil Rights Act. Carpenter
determined not to make any arguments based on gender equality and
went so far as to differentiate the right to work from the right to vote.221
He blatantly argued against the New Departure and claimed that the
right to vote was a political right, not a privilege and immunity protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment.222
Bradwell never commented publicly on Carpenter’s concession that
the right to vote was not included in the privileges and immunities of
citizenship. She instead published Carpenter’s argument in full in the
Chicago Legal News and described it generally as an “able, concise, and
unanswerable argument.”223 Leaders of the suffrage movement, were
not so cavalier. Matilda Joslyn Gage wrote an editorial to the Chicago
Tribune and described as “inconsistent” and “befogging” Carpenter’s
argument that the Fourteenth Amendment granted women civil equality
but not political equality.224 Anthony wrote a personal letter to Bradwell
217. Gilliam, supra note 8, at 119. Bradwell did, nonetheless, praise Carpenter’s argument on
her behalf. Senator Carpenter’s Argument – Liberty of Pursuit, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Jan. 20, 1872, at
108.
218. E. BRUCE THOMPSON, MATTHEW HALE CARPENTER: WEBSTER OF THE WEST 101 (1954).
219. See Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872); THOMPSON, supra note 218, at 101.
220. Smith, supra note 8, at 260.
221. HOFF, supra note 8, at 168-69; Gilliam, supra note 8. See also DuBois, supra note 13, at
19-40.
222. Supreme Court of the United States, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Jan. 20, 1872, at 108-09.
223. Senator Carpenter’s Argument – Liberty of Pursuit, supra note 217.
224. The Political Aspect of the Question, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 8, 1872, at 5.
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describing Carpenter’s arguments as “such a school boy pettifogging
speech . . . wholly without basic principle” but she conceded “still the
courts are so entirely controlled by prejudice and precedent we have
nothing to hope from them but endorsement of dead men’s actions.”225
Perhaps Bradwell remained silent on the point because she understood
the difficulties of crafting an argument that would persuade the Justices.
The U.S. Supreme Court took three years to render its ruling in
Bradwell’s case. When it did, it ruled against Bradwell, basing its
opinion on the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.226 The Court made its decision in Slaughter-House Cases
first, and then applied its reasoning to Bradwell.227 When the majority
opinion by Justice Miller was read in open court – a decision which
discussed its Constitutional grounds but abstained from any comment of
the issue of women’s rights – there was no notable reaction by the
audience in the courtroom. In contrast, when Justice Bradley’s
concurring opinion was read, with its emphasis on separate spheres and
women’s place, one reporter described that “it seemed to cause no little
amusement upon the bench and the bar.”228 The audience apparently
considered Justice Bradley’s horror of a woman comical.
Bradwell offered her own assessment of the Court’s decision in the
Chicago Legal News. She respectfully disagreed with the majority’s
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment – both in determining its
construction and in its definition of the privileges and immunities of
citizens – but she was livid at Bradley’s concurrence. She pointed out
the inconsistency between his dissent in Slaughter-House Cases and his
concurrence in her case. “If, as Justice Bradley says, the liberty of
pursuit is one of the fundamental privileges of an American citizen,” she
asked, “how can he then, and be consistent, deprive an American citizen
of the right to follow any calling or profession under laws, rules and
regulations that shall operate equally upon all, simply because such
citizen is a woman?”229 She posited that he “lower[ed] the dignity” of
his office “by traveling out of the record to give his individual views
upon what we commonly term ‘Woman’s Rights.’”230 The public

225. FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 185 (emphasis deleted) (letter from Anthony to Bradwell
dated June 30, 1873).
226. Gilliam, supra note 8, at 116; SMITH, supra note 175, at 339-41.
227. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
228. More Supreme Court Decisions, BOSTON DAILY ADVERTISER, Apr. 16, 1873, at 1;
Gilliam, supra note 8, at 126; WARREN, supra note 8, at 550.
229. The XIV Amendment and Our Case, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, May 10, 1873, at 390.
230. Id.
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response to Bradwell’s case and to other women lawyers suggests that
Bradwell was not alone in her assessment.
IV. POPULAR SUPPORT FOR CHALLENGES TO THE DOCTRINE OF
SEPARATE SPHERES
The Supreme Court and a number of state courts resisted various
women’s claims for legal equality and, specifically, their attempts to
become licensed attorneys.231 But Supreme Court decisions do not
always or necessarily represent public sentiment on the specific issue in
dispute or those underlying it. In the case of women’s fight for legal
equality, and specifically women’s right to practice law, the Supreme
Court lagged behind a more progressive public sentiment. There were
some state courts and legislatures that granted women rights, including
the right to practice law, even as Justice Bradley pronounced that it was
a violation of divine and natural law.232 And there was evidence of
significant public support for the women who sought to enter the
profession.233
The first evidence of public support for women’s foray into the
legal profession accompanied Arabella Mansfield’s admission, the first
woman who secured a state law license.234 Mansfield had the support of
a number of members of the Iowa bar, including the male lawyers who
administered her bar examination.235 They passed her with high honors
and lauded her skill, noting that “in her examination, she has given the
very best rebuke possible to the imputation that ladies can not qualify for
the practice of law.”236 They further remarked on the changed social
circumstances that, they asserted, required her admission. They
explained that they construed the Iowa statute controlling the admission
of attorneys to include women despite its use of the word “male” as a
response to “the demands and necessities of the present time and
occasion.”237
231. Nineteen state courts refused to admit grant women a license to practice law without an
act from their legislatures. DRACHMAN, supra note 189, at app. 1 (listing the date of admission of
the first woman lawyer in each state and the District of Columbia and whether the admission was
approved by the state court or if an act of the state legislature was required to overcome the court’s
refusal to admit women to its bar).
232. See id.
233. See infra notes 234-249 and accompanying text.
234. See Thomas, supra note 97, at 492.
235. Id. at 493.
236. Ellen Martin, Admission of Women to the Bar, 1 CHI. L. TIMES 76, 76-77 (1887) (quoting
the Examining Committee Report).
237. Id. at 76.
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Support for Mansfield also appeared to extend beyond the activists
that enabled her admission. The lawyers who examined her claimed that
the committee’s support for Mansfield was representative of all the
lawyers in the state. “[W]e feel confident . . . ,” they explained, “that we
speak not only the sentiments of the court and of your committee, but the
entire members of the bar, when we say that we heartily welcome Mrs.
Mansfield as one of our members, and most cordially recommend her
admission.”238 Further evidence of public support was set forth in the
local newspaper, which asserted that Mansfield is a “lady of strong
mind. That she has the brain and the necessary ability to make a good
record for herself no one will dispute.”239 As the number of women
lawyers grew, so it appears did the public’s approval of their endeavors.
Those who supported women lawyers attempted to answer the two
greatest concerns expressed by those, like Justice Bradley, who
championed the doctrine of separate spheres. They argued that women
were intellectually capable of professional pursuits. Simultaneously,
they insisted that working outside of the domestic sphere would neither
make the women unfeminine nor destroy the family. Therefore, a
number of papers that reported on Mansfield’s admission described her
as “the grace and beauty of the Iowa bar.”240
Alta Hulett had similar public support in Illinois in the early 1870s.
Even before she applied for her license, a local reporter had noticed her
monitoring proceedings at the courthouse. 241 The paper described her in
a way that was supportive of her ambitions and reassuring to those who
feared women’s rights would upset the social order. It observed she was
“a charming young lady . . . of more than ordinary personal attractions
bright and prepossessing in appearance, and evidently in earnest in her
purpose to acquire a profession.”242 It suggested that she would make a
competent lawyer by assessing that as she sat in the courtroom she “was
238. A Woman Lawyer at Last, NEWARK ADVOCATE (Newark, OH), July 9 1869, at 1, col. H;
The Athens of Iowa Ahead, MORNING REPUBLICAN (Little Rock, AR), July 14, 1869, at col. A.
239. A Married Woman, supra note 101, at 20 (quoting from the Mount Pleasant Journal);
DAILY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER & WASHINGTON EXPRESS (Washington, D.C.), Oct. 26, 1869, at
col. H.
240. Personal and General, FRANK LESLIE’S ILLUSTRATED NEWSPAPER (New York, NY),
Nov. 27, 1869, at 171, col. C; All Sorts and Sizes, BANGOR DAILY WHIG & COURIER (Bangor, ME),
Nov. 13, 1869, at col. F; see also THE NEWS AND OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC), Aug. 16, 1892, at col.
A (discussing Mansfield being admitted to the bar); Notes, THE DAILY INTER OCEAN (Chicago, IL),
Aug. 27, 1892, at 11, col. B; Current Comment, ST. PAUL DAILY NEWS, Aug. 30, 1892, at 4, col. C;
America’s Female Lawyers, THE ATCHISON DAILY GLOBE (Atchison, KS), Sept. 20, 1892, col. E.
241. See GA WEEKLY TELEGRAPH & GA JOURNAL & MESSENGER, Nov. 15, 1870, at col. D
(reprinting an article from the ROCKFORD REGISTER).
242. Id.
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watching the progress of a case with as much interest as any of the legal
gentlemen present.”243
After Hulett passed the bar but was denied a license, newspapers
around the country covered her story. They cited her ability without any
criticism or objections and with an undertone of support.244 A New
Hampshire paper described the Illinois court as out of step with the
modern times, noting “[t]he ‘old fogy’ Judges of the Illinois Supreme
Court have [now] refused two applications of females [Bradwell and
Hulett] to be admitted to the bar of that State.”245 Local newspapers
increased their support for Hulett when she, with the support of Myra
Bradwell and others, drafted a state law that would open all professions
to women.246
Alta Hulett increased her popular support by lecturing throughout
the state in support of the bill. She crafted an address entitled “Justice
versus the Supreme Court” outlining the issues in her case that included
a general demand for equality between the sexes and a specific demand
that women be granted the right to practice law.247 She debuted her
lecture in her hometown in northern Illinois where the crowds were
overflowing and cheered often throughout her speech.248 One local
paper was so impressed with Hulett it exclaimed “[s]he is an honor to
Rockford.”249
These displays of support for the early women lawyers by members
of their local communities and some members of the bar are not
evidence that the ideology of separate spheres had been overthrown, but
they do suggest that there was growing opposition to its constraints. As
one newspaper described, women’s efforts to practice law were “a new

243. Id.
244. See Personal, THE MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Nov. 10, 1871, at col. C.
245. THE DAILY PATRIOT (Concord, NH), Nov. 23, 1871, at col. B.
246. The law they drafted in the fall of 1871, was “[a]n act to secure to all persons freedom in
the selection of occupation, profession or employment.” S. 275, 27th Sess., at 1024-1026 (Ill.
1872).
247. Alta Hulett first delivered her address on November 25, 1871 in Rockford’s Brown Hall
to a capacity crowd. Miss Alta M. Hulett’s Lecture, ROCKFORD JOURNAL, Dec. 2, 1871, at 1; Miss
Alta M. Hulett’s Lecture, ROCKFORD REGISTER, Dec. 2, 1871, at 1; Miss Hulett’s Lecture,
ROCKFORD GAZETTE, Nov. 30, 1871.
248. Miss Alta M. Hulett’s Lecture, ROCKFORD REGISTER, supra note 247, at 1 (reporting that
the night of Hulett’s debut the Hall was “filled to its utmost capacity . . . [with] not a foot of
standing room unoccupied” and that “over four hundred persons went away unable to get inside”);
Miss Alta M. Hulett’s Lecture, ROCKFORD JOURNAL, supra note 247, at 2 (reporting that Hulett
“spoke for an hour and a half and during the whole time she held [the audience’s] strict attention
and drew from them repeated rounds of applause.”).
249. Miss Alta M. Hulett’s Lecture, ROCKFORD REGISTER, supra note 247, at 1.
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and most interesting phase of the great battle now raging along the entire
of society between Progress and Prescription.”250 There were those that
would never change their minds. Even after women were admitted to
the bar, many members of the bench continued to oppose the idea of
women practicing law. According to Myra Bradwell, after Alta Hulett
was admitted to the bar in 1873, one of the Illinois Supreme Court
judges acknowledged “that she had passed a good examination” but
remarked “if she were his daughter, he would disinherit her.”251
Bradwell described his position as representative of the sentiment among
some of the older members of the profession and resigned that
“[n]othing save a blast from Gabriel’s trumpet can dispel these lifelong
prejudices.”252 But that judge, rather than representing the dominant
sentiment in Illinois, was speaking out against the changes that were
taking place.
Reactions to Myra Bradwell’s case by the press and members of the
bar offered additional support for the changing public sentiment on the
condition of women. First, as Nancy Gilliam has noted, the State of
Illinois did not present any case in opposition to Bradwell’s appeal. It
did not submit a brief to the Supreme Court supporting the Illinois
Supreme Court’s decision nor did it send a representative to the oral
arguments. Although Gilliam claims there is some precedent for this, “it
was not customary for a state to treat a suit so cavalierly.”253
Additionally, there was the single sentence written by a reporter for the
Boston Daily Advertiser that noted that Justice Bradley’s opinion,
describing woman as unfit to practice law and championing separate
spheres, “seemed to cause no little amusement upon the bench and in the
bar.”254 The implication is that Bradley’s position was so out of step
with the current sentiment the audience laughed at his concurring
opinion.
Editorial comments in a number of newspapers offer further
evidence that there was a growing sector that disagreed with Bradley.
The Chicago Tribune claimed that Bradwell had the skills and intellect
to be an attorney255 and described Bradley as “cling[ing] to the old idea

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
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of woman’s sphere in life . . . .”256 Another report, written while the
case was on appeal before Bradley rendered his concurrence, praised
Bradwell for her efforts and expressed its opinion that public sentiment
was on her side: “Mrs. Bradwell has done well to push her claims . . .
[and w]e have not the least doubt that the next legislature of Illinois will
remove the grievance under which this accomplished woman, and all her
sisters in that state, now suffer.”257
Lavinia Goodell, like the other women lawyers, also received
significant support for her professional efforts in local and national
newspapers. When she was first admitted to practice law in Janesville,
Wisconsin, a Milwaukee paper noted the occasion and offered its
support. It attempted to calm any horror of a woman fears its readers
might have by editorializing that Goodell “possesses a pleasing and
modest address.” It also affirmed that she had sufficient “intellectual
vigor to rank among the foremost of her profession.”258 Other
newspapers across the country noted the event without editorial, but
without any negative undercurrent.259
Goodell also received broad public support after Chief Justice Ryan
denied her application in an opinion that closely followed Justice
Bradley’s position.260 Wisconsin attorney Ole Mosness published an
editorial in the Wisconsin State Journal criticizing the court’s
decision.261 The Wisconsin press called the decision unjust and
predicted that, “[t]here will be very decided dissenting opinions
256. Woman’s Right to Practice Law, CHI. DAILY TRIB., May 11, 1873, at 8. Note that there
were some who did not support separate spheres but were critical of Bradwell and the woman’s
movement for bringing this case when it was apparent that they would lose. WARREN, supra note 8,
at 550 n.1 (quoting THE NATION, Apr. 24, 1873). See also Women Practice in the Courts – A Test
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16,1873, at 1 (reprinting an article from the Chicago Journal which was
published before the Supreme Court rendered its decision, offering support for Bradwell’s argument
that women are citizens and can practice law).
257. A Feminine Dred Scott Case, supra note 250, at 4.
258. Admitted to Practice, MILWAUKEE DAILY SENTINEL, June 19, 1874, at 5, col. C; see also
THE GALVESTON DAILY NEWS, July 23, 1874, at col. D (noting that Goodell “is said to be a lady of
good education, fine appearance, and modest bearing”).
259. About Women, LOWELL DAILY CITIZEN AND NEWS (Lowell, MA), June 29, 1874, at col.
C; General Intelligence, BOSTON INVESTIGATOR, July 8, 1874, at 6, col. D; Personalities,
CLEVELAND DAILY HERALD, July 3, 1874, at 4, col. F (noting Goodell was admitted “after passing
a very creditable examination”).
260. See In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232, 244-45 (1875); see also Supreme Court of Wisconsin,
CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Mar. 11, 1876, at 196, 199.
261. See Miss Goodell’s Application Denied, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Mar. 4, 1876, at 191
(reprinting the Wisconsin State Journal article); see also Mr. Mosness on Judge Ryan’s Opinion,
CHI. LEGAL NEWS, May 13, 1876, at 271 (letter by Mosness to Bradwell arguing that the Chief
Justice of the Wisconsin court’s “prejudice against women in the practice of law” influenced him to
“disregard the plain provision of the statute”).
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expressed by members of the bar and by the people . . . .” 262 A
Milwaukee paper explained that Ryan denied Goodell’s application
based on a “law that is about a thousand years old.” And finally, the
Journal contended that if practicing law would place women’s purity in
danger, “it would be better to reconstruct the court and the bar, than to
exclude the women.”263
When Goodell subsequently reapplied for admission to the
Wisconsin State Supreme Court bar, after she secured a new law that
allowed women to be admitted,264 newspapers again offered their
support for Goodell and for women’s rights in general. One editorial
despaired at the lingering prejudices that existed within the judiciary.
“The prejudice of sex is the most imbecile, the least excusable, of all
prejudices – and yet it is one of the strongest.” 265 This author perceived
the prejudice against women as persistent and pervasive: “the
intolerance of woman workers in the fields assumed to be out of their
sphere is as bitter and almost widespread as ever.”266 And yet, the
author’s own position and the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s subsequent
admission of Goodell (Ryan was the sole dissenter), suggest that the
prejudice had lessened.
Public support for women lawyers increased throughout the decade.
By 1877 The New York World published an article encouraging women
to practice law, especially in the Federal Courts.267 It cited Alta Hulett
and Phoebe Couzins, a lawyer practicing in St. Louis, as examples of
women “who have succeeded fairly, as well as men of equal mental
caliber would have done, and this without ceasing to be womanly.”268
The “womanly” qualifier reflects the opposition Myra Bradwell faced

262. Miss Goodell’s Application Denied, supra note 261, at 191; see also Female Lawyers,
MILWAUKEE DAILY SENTINEL, Feb. 24, 1876, at 7, col. A (reprinting Ryan’s opinion without
textual editorial, but revealing its support for Goodell in its extended headline which reads “Female
Lawyers. Opinion of Chief Justice Ryan in the Case of Miss Lavinia Goodell. The Reasons for
Refusing Her Application to the Bar. Law That Is About a Thousand Years Old”).
263. Miss Goodell’s Application Denied, supra note 261, at 191. In 1877, with the support of
every lawyer in her county, Goodell secured a law that prohibited sex as grounds for denying a law
license. See Cleary, supra note 189, at 265.
264. Cleary, supra note 189, at 265 (describing Goodell’s bill prohibiting the denial of a state
law license on the basis of sex and its enactment on March 22, 1877). Goodell reapplied for her law
license in the spring of 1879. Id. at 267.
265. MILWAUKEE DAILY SENTINEL, Apr. 25, 1879, at 4, col. B (discussing Lavinia Goodell’s
application to the bar).
266. Id.
267. INTER OCEAN (Chicago, IL), Jan. 31, 1877, at 4, col. F (summarizing article from NEW
YORK WORLD).
268. Id.
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when some, like Justice Bradley, claimed that a woman attorney would
violate the natural order. The World strongly supported women leaving
the domestic sphere and entering the public one. “There can be no
earthly reason,” it continued “why women should not be admitted to
compete with men in any occupation for which they are fitted . . . .”269
By the 1890s, papers throughout the country commented on the
increase in the number of women lawyers. They particularly noted that
there were several women practicing who were members of the Supreme
Court Bar. A newspaper in Bismark, North Dakota described these
accomplishments and then editorialized, “[i]n a single decade the
number of women lawyers increased from one to seventy-five.”270 None
of the papers expressed any opposition or even discussed the issue of
separate spheres; rather, there was a suggestion of pride in the way
society had progressed.
IV. CONCLUSION
Myra Bradwell lost her appeal, but the Supreme Court decision in
Bradwell v. Illinois should not historically negate the innovations she
forged through her case. Each act Bradwell took in the process – from
her initial application, her briefs to the Illinois Supreme Court, her
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, and her prolific editorials on every
aspect of her case and the cases of others – brought attention to the legal
issues, garnered significant popular support for the cause, and advanced
the women’s rights movement. Through her legal arguments, she also
initiated two legal innovations that became important tools in the fight
for rights: crafting the foundations of sociological jurisprudence and
forging the argument that the Equal Protection Clause should be applied
to women. She drew on the ideas and assistance of other women’s rights
activists, men and women, to develop these innovations, and encouraged
others to continue the fight. Over the subsequent century, the women’s
rights movement developed and implemented the arguments Bradwell
initiated in her case. Their legacy, however, (and perhaps, of course)
was mixed.
The evolution of Bradwell’s early sociological jurisprudence
arguments is complicated. Many scholars have identified Florence
Kelley’s work at Hull House in Chicago and as the executive director of
the National Consumers League in New York to advance protective

269. Id.
270. Woman Lawyers, BISMARCK DAILY TRIB., June 20, 1891, at 2, col. D.
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labor legislation as a significant contribution to the development of
sociological jurisprudence.271 Kelley first initiated these reforms for
women and children with the intention of then expanding their
protections to male laborers. As Rogers Smith explains, efforts to secure
“protection for all and [maintain] a consistent, egalitarian liberal
feminism, [had] proved to be inadequate, but there [was] no doubt that
conditions of working women did urgently demand improvement.”272
Kelley and her colleague Josephine Goldmark developed the idea of
using current economic and sociological evidence to enact laws that
would limit the hours women laborers could be required to work,
establish a minimum wage, and establish health and safety requirements
for conditions in the workplace. Together they gathered the evidence and
drafted the document that became known as the Brandeis brief. They
convinced Louis Brandeis to argue their case before the U.S. Supreme
Court and won a victory when the Court upheld Oregon’s ten-hour work
day law in Muller v. Oregon.273 Roscoe Pound later labeled this strategy
as sociological jurisprudence.274
Part of this strategy initially required arguing that laboring women
needed special protections, drawing on the old notions of women’s
delicacy. This appeared to be inconsistent with women’s rights
activists’ demands for legal equality. Scholars continue to debate the
cost and effectiveness of these reforms and the damage they did to the
women’s rights campaign.275 These laws were at the heart of the second
major split in the women’s movement in the 1920s when protective

271. HELENE SILVERBERG, GENDER AND AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE: THE FORMATIVE
YEARS 13-14 (1998); Felice Batlan, Law and the Fabric of the Everyday: The Settlement Houses,
Sociological Jurisprudence, and the Gendering of Urban Legal Culture, 15 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J.
235 (2006); Ira Harkavy & John L. Puckett, Lessons from Hull House for the Contemporary Urban
University, 68 SOC. SERVICE REV.299 (Sep., 1994); Andrew R. Timming, Florence Kelley: A
Recognition of Her Contributions to Sociology, 4 J. CLASSICAL SOC. 289 (Nov. 2004).
272. Smith, supra note 8, at 270.
273. 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Susan D. Carle, Gender in the Construction of the Lawyer’s
Persona, 22 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 239, 245 (1999); Ronald K.L. Collins & Jennifer Friesen,
Looking Back on Muller v. Oregon, 69 A.B.A. J. 294 (1983). After the Nineteenth Amendment was
enacted in 1920 granting women suffrage, the Supreme Court insincerely found that women no
longer needed protective laws and maximum hours laws for women. Adkins v. Children’s Hospital.
261 U.S. 525 (1923); see I DISSENT 127 (Mark Tushnet ed., 2008); Smith, supra note 8, at 276. But
see Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924) (upholding a law that prohibited women in New York
from working after 10 pm until 6 am); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)
(upholding a minimum wage for women, recognizing for the first time that laborers were not on an
equal standing with employers in negotiating a contract for labor).
274. See supra notes 138-139 and accompanying text.
275. JUDITH A. BAER, THE CHAINS OF PROTECTION: THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO WOMEN’S
LABOR LEGISLATION 66 (1978).
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legislation proponents bitterly fought with Alice Paul and the proponents
of her proposed Equal Rights Amendment.276 They were also in conflict
with women who brought claims of sex discrimination based on the
Equal Protection clause.277
But there were others who followed Bradwell’s example and used
evidence of women’s social advances to support arguments for sex
equality. In the 1880s and 1890s other women lawyers used Bradwell’s
argument about the changing social circumstances and position of
women to secure entrance to other state bars and, as discussed, Belva
Lockwood and her supporters used the argument to secure the 1879
federal law that allowed women lawyers to practice in the federal
courts.278 Additionally, some women activists employed the strategy to
fight for criminal laws and procedures that would protect women’s
bodies from physical and sexual abuse.279 In the twentieth century,
women lawyers including Catharine Waugh McCulloch and Dorothy
Kenyon used these arguments in their campaigns for women jury
service.280
The Supreme Court considered only a very few cases in which
women made a claim of sex discrimination based on the Equal
Protection Clause in the century after Bradwell.281 The Supreme Court’s
decision in Slaughter-House Cases that the Equal Protection Clause was
limited to ensuring the rights of African Americans stunted women’s
initial invocation of the clause. But the Court abandoned that distinction
in its decisions on sex discrimination claims in the twentieth century.
During the first half of the century, the Court rejected claims of sex
discrimination based on the Equal Protection Clause by claiming that
discrimination based on sex was not arbitrary, but rational, because men
and women weren’t equal. As Justice Holmes explained in Quong Wing
276. Mary Becker, The Sixties Shift to Formal Equality and the Courts: An Argument for
Pragmatism and Politics, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 209, 212, 214-16 (1998).
277. Id. at 222-29.
278. MORELLO, supra note 4, at 34-35.
279. Elizabeth Pleck, Feminist Responses to “Crimes Against Women, 1868-1896,” 8 SIGNS
451 (1983).
280. For a description of Dorothy Kenyon and her work and arguments for woman jury
service, see SUSAN M. HARTMANN, THE OTHER FEMINISTS: ACTIVISTS IN THE LIBERAL
ESTABLISHMENT 58-61 (1998); LINDA KERBER, NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES:
WOMEN AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 169-70 (1998). For a description of Catherine
Waugh McCulloch’s work and arguments for woman jury service, see Catherine Waugh
McCulloch, “Trial by Jury,” The Woman Citizen (Oct. 2, 1920), at 488; Gretchen Ritter, Jury
Service and Women’s Citizenship Before and After the Nineteenth Amendment, 20 LAW HIST. REV.
479 (2002).
281. I DISSENT, supra note 273, at 127.
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v. Kirkendall, “the 14th Amendment does not interfere [with a law that
makes a distinction in sex by placing a lighter burden on women than
men] by creating a fictitious equality where there is a real difference.”282
But there were those who disagreed, including women lawyers and
an occasional dissenting Supreme Court Justice. In his dissent in Quong
Wing, Justice Joseph Lamar argued that the Montana law that imposed a
tax on men that did hand laundry work but exempted women, was an
arbitrary distinction.283 He wrote, “[t]he individual characteristics of the
owner do not furnish a basis on which to make a classification for
purposes of taxation.”284 Justice Rutledge made a similar argument in
his dissent in Goesaert v. Cleary in 1948, asserting that since the
Michigan law “arbitrarily discriminate[d] between male and female
owners of liquor establishments,” it was a denial of equal protection.285
The sex equality decisions by Congress and the Supreme Court
during the second half of the twentieth century are well-studied.286 In
1963, Congress passed the Equal Pay Act that prohibited sex
discrimination in federal salaries.287 In 1964, Congress enacted Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act that made it illegal for an employer to
discriminate on the basis of sex. In 1972, Congress passed Title IX of
the Education Amendments that prohibited sex discrimination in
education programs that received federal funds and the Equal Rights
Amendment, although it failed ratification. In 1971, the Supreme Court
began to apply the Equal Protection Clause to overturn legislation that
arbitrarily discriminated on the basis of sex,288 although it continues to

282. 223 U.S. 59, 63 (1912); see Smith, supra note 8, at 272 (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment
did not require imposing ‘a fictitious equality where there is a real difference.’” (quoting Quong
Wing, 223 U.S. at 63)). See also Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335
U.S. 464 (1948); Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
283. 223 U.S. 59, 64 (1911) (Lamar, J., dissenting).
284. Id. at 64-65 (Lamar, J., dissenting).
285. 335 U.S. 464, 468 (1948) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
286. See Leslie W. Gladstone, Women’s Issues in Congress: Selected Legislation 1832-1998,
in WOMEN AND WOMEN’S ISSUES IN CONGRESS 11 (Janet V. Lewis ed., 2000) (listing and
describing federal laws that granted women rights though the nineteenth and twentieth centuries).
287. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
206 90d (2000)). See also CYNTHIA HARRISON, ON ACCOUNT OF SEX: THE POLITICS OF WOMEN’S
ISSUES, 1945-1968, at 899 (1988).
288. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (finding a statute that required a preference
for a male administrator for a decedent’s estate was an equal protection violation); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (finding denial of housing and medical benefits to the families of
female military officers was an equal protection violation). See also Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Constitutional Adjudication in the United States as a Means of Advancing the Equal Stature of Men
and Women Under the Law, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 263, 267-68 (1997).
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debate what level of scrutiny to use in evaluating such laws.289 Many
scholars argue that despite these decisions, sex inequality persists.290
Myra Bradwell’s case and legacy is not a story of great victory, but
neither is it one of great defeat.

289. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (introducing intermediate scrutiny as a midpoint
between strict scrutiny and a rational basis standard); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)
(applying a stronger “skeptical scrutiny” standard); Serena Mayeri, Constitutional Choices: Legal
Feminism and the Historical Dynamics of Change, 92 CAL. L. REV. 761, 827-34 (2004) (arguing the
feminist strategy to use the Equal Protection Clause to secure equality and the Court’s interpretation
of that clause limited the content of the equality). See also Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender
and the Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297 (2001) (arguing
that although the ERA was never ratified, the amendment, nonetheless, influenced the judges to
interpret the Fourteenth Amendment in a frame of formal equality rather than a substantive one).
290. See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979);
Lynn Hecht Schafran, Is the Law Male?, TRIAL, Aug. 1995, at 18; Lynn Hecht Schafran, Is the Law
Male?: Let Me Count the Ways, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 397 (1993); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN,
THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM (1991); Leslie
Bender, Is Tort Law Male?: Foreseeability Analysis and Property Managers’ Liability for Third
Party Rapes of Residents, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 313 (1993); Sylvia A. Law and Patricia
Hennessey, Is the Law Male?: The Case of Family Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 354 (1993); Dorothy
E. Roberts, Rape, Violence, and Women’s Autonomy, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 359 (1993); Sarah E.
Burns, Is the Law Male?: The Role of Experts, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 389 (1993).
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